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Abstract
This Article examines an issue of regulatory competition that seems to be of greater interest
for the corporate governance of large, publicly traded firms: the position of the employees. The
Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the basic premise of the analysis by describing why
employees may be relevant to the corporate governance structure. This Part will briefly draw on
economic theory to explain why, at least under certain circumstances, it can be beneficial to create
an institutional structure that facilitates long-term commitment between firms and their employees.
Part II identifies aspects of European corporate law that are relevant to labor and corporate law
arbitrage opportunities. After delineating the scope of regulatory arbitrage, this Part describes the
three main issues that surround regulatory arbitrage. The most important of these are employee
participation systems, which give employee representatives a say in corporate governance. The
second issue relates to the controversial issue of directors’ duties, with special attention to the
extent that directors may defend against hostile takeovers. A third and often overlooked issue
is the degree to which directors are independent from shareholder intervention. Finally, Part III
presents the core of the analysis by describing the economic consequences of ex ante and ex
post regulatory choice. Regulatory arbitrage provides the advantages of increased flexibility and
possibilities to avoid some obviously inefficient regulation. On the other hand, mechanisms that
may help to foster long-term commitment of firm employees are undermined by ex post arbitrage
opportunities because of shareholders inability to permanently commit to a particular system. This
Article argues that employee participation systems are at risk, in spite of the arbitrage limitations
set by secondary EU law.
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TILTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL AND 
LABOR? THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY 
ARBITRAGE IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 
ON EMPLOYEES 
Martin Gelter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”) 
seminal Centros decision,1 which ushered in a series of cases that 
now allow firms to choose their country of registration regardless 
of the location of their business activities, regulatory competition 
in European corporate law has still not come of age. True, 
Centros, Überseering,2 and Inspire Art3 have collectively transformed 
European corporate law into a transnational field of research and 
triggered a debate about regulatory competition. Some scholars 
have optimistically argued that the ECJ has ushered in an era of a 
race to the top in the European Union (“EU”), meaning that the 
forces of competition will coerce member states to optimize their 
laws.4 Others have, justifiably, expressed doubt as to whether 
there will be much, if any, regulatory competition.5 Some have 
 
*  Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law, and Research Associate, 
European Corporate Governance Institute. For comments and discussion of prior 
versions of this article I would like to thank Roger Goebel, Reinier Kraakman, Mark Roe, 
and Tobias Tröger. 
1. Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-
1459. 
2. Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), Case C-
208/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919. 
3. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., Case 
C-167/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10155. 
4. See, e.g., STEFANO LOMBARDO, REGULATORY COMPETITION IN COMPANY LAW IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PREREQUESITES AND LIMITS (2002); John Armour, Who 
Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition, 58 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 369 (2005); Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate 
Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 477 (2004). 
5. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 15 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1259 (2004). 
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taken mixed or skeptical positions.6 At the very least, the notion 
that any member state could establish itself as a fully fledged 
“European Delaware” is probably deemed unlikely by the 
majority of scholars.7 
So far, the academic literature has focused mostly on the 
long-term consequences within the triangle between investors, 
large shareholders, and managers. In practice, legal issues 
relating to corporate creditors have been the main driver of 
regulatory arbitrage.8 The incorporation of thousands of newly-
founded firms in a particular jurisdiction, typically England, that 
intend to be active primarily in another one, in many cases 
Germany,9 is said to undermine the capital maintenance and 
creditor protection systems in countries that import the 
corporate law of a more liberal corporate law.10 Some recent 
reforms to legal capital and other policies intended to protect 
creditors have been identified as a form of “defensive” regulatory 
competition—measures attempting to prevent economic entities 
from incorporating elsewhere that are intended to do business in 
the member state where these legislative measures are taken.11 
 
6. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European 
Corporate Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2005); Tobias H. Tröger, Choice of Jurisdiction in 
European Corporate Law: Perspectives of European Corporate Governance, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV. 3, 6 (2005). 
7. See, e.g., Enriques, supra note 5; see also, e.g., Gelter, supra note 6, at 253–64; 
Tröger, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
8. See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old World Encountered the New 
One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 
TUL. L. REV. 577, 612–13 (2007). 
9. See Udo Kornblum, Bundesweite Rechtstatsachen zum Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht, Stand 1.1.2008 [Nationwide Facts on Business and Corporate Law, as of 
1.1.2008], 100 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU [GMBHR] 25, 31 (2009) (F.R.G.) (estimating roughly 
15,000 limited liability companies in Germany as of year-end 2007). See generally Marco 
Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 
241 (2008) (providing empirical data on the basis of the residence of directors). 
10. Centros and its progeny have triggered an intense academic debate about 
creditor protection rules, which are thought to be more important in Europe than in 
the United States. See generally LEGAL CAPITAL IN EUROPE. ECFR SPECIAL NO. 1 (Marcus 
Lutter ed., 2006); THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A 
TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE (Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön eds., 2008) 
(analyzing the merits of legal capital from various perspectives); Luca Enriques & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal 
Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001) (criticizing legal capital as inefficient); 
Peter O. Mülbert & Max Birke, Legal Capital—Is There a Case Against the European Legal 
Capital Rules?, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 695 (2002) (same). 
11. A recent German reform can be clearly identified as motivated by regulatory 
competition. The Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung 
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However, these creditor protection mechanisms are usually an 
impediment only to the formation of new firms, which is why 
“defensive” regulatory competition primarily affects just these 
new businesses.12 
This Article examines an issue of regulatory competition 
that seems to be of greater interest for the corporate governance 
of large, publicly traded firms: the position of employees. EU 
member states offer a wide spectrum of different systems of 
mandatory “employee participation,” under which a firm’s 
employees enjoy representation on a corporation’s board of 
directors. The two recent innovations of secondary EU law that 
permit the formation of the European Company—Societas 
Europaea (“SE”)—and the cross-border merger at first seem to 
 
von Missbräuchen [Act to Modernize the GmbH Laws and Combat Abuse], Oct. 23, 
2008, BGBl. I at 2026, takes various measures to facilitate the formation process for the 
limited liability company, or Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (“GmbH”), and 
introduces the entrepreneur corporation, or Unternehmergesellschaft, which is not subject 
to the minimum capital requirement, but does require a business entitys taking this 
form to use the designation “Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt)” or simply “UG 
(haftungsbeschränkt)” in its name. See id., § 5(a). For a detailed description of the German 
reform, which does not take the final version into account, see William W. Bratton et al., 
How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 
347, 381–82 (2009). The protocols of the parliamentary debate clearly show, as do 
previous proposals for the law, that the motivation for the enactment of this reform was 
competition among jurisdictions and the influx of firms incorporated in England, 
notwithstanding their high rates of failure. See Erklärung von Sabine Zimmermann 
[Statement of Sabine Zimmermann], Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache [BTDrucks] 
16/172, at 18196 (quoting Doctor Jürgen Gehb as stating that “we are standing in 
European competition, not only regarding the production of goods and services, but 
also with respect to legal systems and legal forms. We accept this competition. We want 
to and have to win it.”); Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts 
und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG) [Draft Act to Modernize the GmbH 
Laws and Combat Abuse (MoMiG)], BTDrucks 16/6140, at 56 (the original government 
draft explicitly stating that the “GmbH should remain internationally competitive”). 
Similarly spirited Dutch and Austrian projects are looming on the horizon. See, e.g., 
Bratton et al., supra, at 31, 34–36 (discussing the planned Dutch reform); REPUBLIK 
ÖSTERREICH [REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA], REGIERUNGSPROGRAMM [GOVERNMENT PROGRAM] 
2008–2013, at 138–39 (2008), at http://www.austria.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=32965 
(declaration by the Austrian government announcing, among many other things, that 
minimum capital will be reduced during the current legislative period). 
12. The fact that new businesses have made use of the freedom of incorporation in 
some countries far more than in others also seems to be influenced by administrative 
burdens or even blatant ignorance of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) case law 
that the authorities in some states impose on setting up a branch office. See Marco Becht 
et al., Centros and the Cost of Branching, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 171 (2009) (reporting on 
branching costs of several thousand Euros in Italy and a complete disregard of the 
Centros decision in Greece). 
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limit the ability for corporate law arbitrage relating to this group 
by requiring the merging firms to negotiate with employees 
about their representation rights as a precondition to the 
merger. However, this Article emphasizes that this protection is 
incomplete, and that the structure imposed by these directives 
subverts the basic premises, and potential economic 
functionality, of employee participation systems. Specifically, the 
regulatory arbitrage13 driven by controlling shareholders can 
have negative effects for employees going beyond employee 
participation systems in firms that have operated for decades.14 
The economic function of employee participation systems, to 
foster long-term commitment, is undermined by the inability of 
shareholders to commit to a particular regime. An analysis of the 
position of employees would not be complete if it were restricted 
to participation systems. This Article therefore also addresses 
other potentially relevant mechanisms affected by regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities, particularly the degree to which 
management is directly or indirectly influenced by shareholders. 
The Article suggests that controlling shareholders, whose 
presence characterizes corporate governance structures in much 
of Europe, are in a good position to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities to the disadvantage not only of minority investors, 
but also of employees. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the basic 
premise of the analysis by describing why employees may be 
relevant to the corporate governance structure. This Part will 
briefly draw on economic theory to explain why, at least under 
 
13. This Article prefers the terms regulatory choice and regulatory arbitrage over 
regulatory competition. This is because, as previously noted, the evidence for actual 
regulatory competition of member states actively seeking re-incorporation remains 
scarce. The most interesting national reaction to regulatory arbitrage so far is a recent 
proposal by a group of German law professors to allow German companies to negotiate 
with employees about the introduction of a flexible employee participation system 
comparable based on the same negotiation mechanism that is required for the 
formation of a European Company (Societas Europaea (“SE”)) or a cross-border merger. 
See Arbeitskreis “Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung,” Entwurf einer Regelung zur 
Mitbestimmungsvereinbarung sowie zur Größe des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats [Draft Rules on 
Codetermination Agreement and the Size of the Supervisory Board Codetermination], 2009 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 885 (F.R.G.). For purposes of this Article, regulatory 
arbitrage will mean that the involved parties make deliberated choices about the law. 
14. See Daniel Komo & Charlotte Villiers, Are Trends in European Company Law 
Threatening Industrial Democracy?, 34 EUR. L. REV. 175, 192–93 (2009) (discussing the 
effects of incorporation choice of small firms on employee involvement). 
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certain circumstances, it can be beneficial to create an 
institutional structure that facilitates long-term commitment 
between firms and their employees. Part II identifies aspects of 
European corporate law that are relevant to labor and corporate 
law arbitrage opportunities. After delineating the scope of 
regulatory arbitrage, this Part describes the three main issues that 
surround regulatory arbitrage. The most important of these are 
employee participation systems, which give employee 
representatives a say in corporate governance. The second issue 
relates to the controversial issue of directors’ duties, with special 
attention to the extent that directors may defend against hostile 
takeovers. A third and often overlooked issue is the degree to 
which directors are independent from shareholder intervention. 
Finally, Part III presents the core of the analysis by describing the 
economic consequences of ex ante and ex post regulatory 
choice. Regulatory arbitrage provides the advantages of increased 
flexibility and possibilities to avoid some obviously inefficient 
regulation. On the other hand, mechanisms that may help to 
foster long-term commitment of firm employees are undermined 
by ex post arbitrage opportunities because of shareholders 
inability to permanently commit to a particular system. This 
Article argues that employee participation systems are at risk, in 
spite of the arbitrage limitations set by secondary EU law. 
I. WHY BOTHER ABOUT EMPLOYEES IN CORPORATE LAW? 
It is tempting to argue that employees play an insignificant 
role in corporate law arbitrage. After all, the contractarian 
approach, which predominates in academic analysis of corporate 
law, presumes that nonshareholder constituencies of the firm 
have their rights specified by contract, which is why they are said 
to not bear a risk comparable to that of shareholders.15 However, 
 
15. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991) (describing shareholders as the bearers of the greatest 
risk); Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 447, 
449 (2009) (identifying shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of corporate law 
according to the majority of scholars). Creditors are sometimes considered an exception 
to this theory, even by those that endorse the shareholder primacy view. See, e.g., Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
443 (2001). The rationale behind this exception is that creditors suffer the downside 
risk when the company approaches insolvency. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of 
Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 164–70 (1977). Both U.K. and U.S. law has 
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much of the literature on the theory of the firm now considers 
the assumption of complete contracts to be an oversimplification 
that carries with it analytical limitations;16 other firm 
constituencies may also be exposed to risk because of firm-
specific investment by these groups. Most important to this 
Article, workers often make such an investment by acquiring 
skills that are only useful within their current employment 
relationship.17 This type of investment may initially be costly to 
acquire, but it allows employees to gain quasi rents in the course 
of the relationship with the firm. As a result, the productive 
process of the firm may sometimes improve, thus increasing the 
total corporate “pie,” either because of productivity increases or 
because skilled workers can be motivated to take on the job (for 
instance, due to moving costs).18 
The traditional agency view of corporate law assumes 
employee investment to be fully protected by contract, which is 
why many describe employees as avoiding residual risk.19 
However, real-life contracts are not normally “complete 
 
therefore developed doctrines suggesting that directors have duties towards creditors in 
the vicinity of insolvency. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’n Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 
1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Neth., N.V. v. Pathe Commc’n Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 
1991 WL 277613, at 34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); W. Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. 
Dodd, [1988] B.C.L.C. 250 (Eng.). But see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., 
Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007) (denying direct fiduciary claims against 
directors by creditors and limiting these duties to situations where the firm is already 
insolvent). 
16. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (1999). 
17. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1996); John 
Armour & Simon Deakin, Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 443, 445–46 (2002); Larry Fauver & 
Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence 
from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 679 (2006); Gavin Kelly & John 
Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 113, 123–27 (John Parkinson et al. eds., 2000); 
David Kershaw, No End in Sight for the History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee 
Participation in Corporate Governance, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 34, 42–46 (2002); see also James 
M. Malcomson, Individual Employment Contracts, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 
2291, 2330–33 (Orley Aschenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing the labor 
economics literature on contractual protection of specific investment). 
18. See, e.g., EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY 232 (2d ed. 2005); see also ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE 
AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 135 (1994) (quoting a Texas 
engineer as describing career mobility as the norm following the advent of Silicon 
Valley). 
19. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
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contingent” agreements.20 The transaction cost necessary to 
anticipate every improbable state of the world would exceed the 
potential welfare gains from incorporating such provisions into 
the contract. Being subject to bounded rationality, parties might 
be unable to foresee possible contingencies and to process the 
information they receive because of cognitive limitations.21 More 
specifically, economic theory suggests that it is in many cases 
impossible to make human capital investment a condition of an 
enforceable contract, because courts will often be unable to 
determine whether an employee has made the specified amount 
of relationship-specific investments.22 It follows that employees 
whose future gains from the continued employment relationship 
are not protected against opportunism from other corporate 
constituencies (particularly controlling shareholders, who 
typically hold an ex post interest to maximize stock value) will 
avoid making specific investment in the first place. Even in 
corporate finance, the “purely financial” view of corporate 
governance no longer dominates entirely. In the latest edition of 
their leading textbook, Brealey, Myers, and Allen note that 
“managers and employees of a firm are investors, too . . . . If you 
give financial capital too much power, the human capital doesn’t 
show up—or if it does show up, it won’t be properly motivated.”23 
By going public, stockholders can commit “not to interfere if 
managers and employees capture private benefits when the firm 
is successful.”24 In other words, one economic function of the 
publicly traded firm may be to serve as a nexus for specific 
investment. 
 
20. A complete contingent contract would require stipulations for payoffs to all 
parties under every single possible state of the world, however unlikely. See, e.g., Alan 
Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 277, 277 (Peter K. Newman ed., 1999). 
21. The idea of “bounded rationality” is attributed to Herbert Simon. See Herbert 
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 104 (1955); see also OLIVER 
HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 81 (1995); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45–46 (1985); Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1477 (1998). 
22. Cf. FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 18, at 233 (defining the terms “verifiable” 
and “observable”); HART, supra note 21, at 37–38 n.15 (same). 
23. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 949 (8th ed. 2006). 
24. Id. at 949 n.36. 
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It is unnecessary to address the issue of what degree of 
specific human capital investment is important in particular 
corporate governance systems. Nevertheless, the various aspects 
of corporate law discussed in Part II are likely to influence 
whether employees have incentive to invest. Moreover, the 
impact of regulatory arbitrage opportunities on the shareholder-
employee relationship are of interest even if one does not follow 
the specific-asset theory of human capital because the utility 
derived from employees may be of interest from a distributive 
perspective.25 A particular corporate governance structure in any 
given country is likely to be an equilibrium result of bargaining 
on the political level and the outcome of historical path 
dependence. As such, it may, in any given society, gain wide 
acceptance as a balanced solution tolerable to the relevant 
interest groups.26 Regulatory arbitrage creates possibilities to 
modify this outcome without universal assent or at least an open 
debate that probably most would prefer to have about such an 
important issue of social and economic governance. 
II. CORPORATE LAW ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES 
AFFECTING EMPLOYEES 
In order to analyze regulatory arbitrage opportunities, it is 
necessary to delineate the extent to which corporate law affects 
the relationship between a firm and its employees. Part II.A 
identifies issues that are potentially subject to regulatory 
arbitrage, and Part II.B will study the effects that these issues are 
likely to have on employees. 
A. Delineating the Scope of Employee-Related Regulatory Competition 
The primary fields of law governing the employee-firm 
relationship would seem to be employment and labor law, which 
 
25. Cf. Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 497, 498 (defining corporate governance 
“as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents 
generated by the firm”). 
26. See generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998) (arguing that 
economically efficient policy choices may not be sustainable because of political 
backlash); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003) 
(developing a theory of comparative corporate governance focusing on the role of past 
political choices that may have been economically inefficient, but necessary to achieve 
social peace). 
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are not objects of regulatory competition in corporate law. 
Under the new European regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, colloquially known as the Rome I 
Regulation, employment contracts are normally governed by the 
law of the jurisdiction where the employee “habitually carries out 
his work in performance of the contract,” even “if he is 
temporarily employed in another country.”27 If no such country 
can be identified, the contract is governed “by the law of the 
country where the place of business through which the employee 
was engaged is situated.”28 Other laws apply only when it can be 
shown that “the contract is more closely connected with” another 
country.29 While the regulation allows for choice of law,30 the 
latter may not deprive the employee of mandatory protection 
accorded to him under the otherwise applicable default law.31 
Rights collectively held by employees, such as the right to 
establish works councils, and the specification of their rights and 
competences, typically depend on the location of the business 
establishment.32 In fact, EU law requires large transnational firms 
with a cross-border scope of activities to permit the establishment 
of a European Works Council.33 A 2002 directive further requires 
 
27. Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 
I), No. 593/2008, art. 8(2), 2008 O.J. L 177/6. 
28. Id. art. 8(3). 
29. Id. art. 8(4). 
30. See id. art. 3. 
31. See id. art. 8(1). For a more detailed discussion of the equivalent predecessor 
provisions of these rules in the former Rome I convention, see SIR PETER NORTH & J.J. 
FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 208–10 (13th ed. 2004). 
See also Sebastian Krebber, Conflict of Laws in Employment in Europe, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 501, 522–29 (2000). 
32. See Krebber, supra note 31, at 538–39. For a German perspective, see Rolf Birk, 
in 1 MÜNCHENER HANDBUCH ZUM ARBEITSRECHT [MUNICH HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT 
AND LABOR LAW] § 22 , cmts. 5–6 (Reinhard Richardi & Otfried Wlotzke eds., 2d ed. 
2000) (F.R.G.) (explaining the principle of territoriality), and Dieter Martiny, in 10 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH [MUNICH COMMENTARY ON 
THE CIVIL CODE] EBGBG art. 30, cmts. 129–36 (Kurt Rebmann et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) 
(F.R.G.) (same). For a French perspective, see PIERRE MAYER & VINCENT HEUZÉ, DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 553–54 (9th ed. 2007) (Fr.) 
(pointing out that collective rights of employees necessarily depend on territoriality and 
mentioning a case where an international firm had to permit a works council in its 
French operations). 
33. Council Directive on the Establishment of a European Works Council or a 
Procedure in Community-Scale Undertakings and Community-Scale Group 
Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees, No. 94/45, art. 
1(2), 1994 O.J. L 254/64, amended by 1998 O.J. L 10/22 (extending the original 
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member states to implement information and consultation 
systems for employee representatives in other firms that exceed a 
minimum size, while leaving to national law the question 
regarding how employees should be represented.34 Any 
regulatory arbitrage regarding these rules will therefore be only 
an element of competition for businesses in general— 
employment law may influence the decision where to locate a 
plant, but as a factor in regulatory competition it will be strongly 
confounded with other aspects pertinent to its physical location, 
including taxation. 
B. Employee Participation Systems and Codetermination 
While at least some of the issues outlined above are no 
doubt important, in particular the requirement to consult with 
works councils and other employee representatives, these rules 
are not subject to corporate law regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities. However, some corporate law issues are of 
considerable importance to employees as well, which is discussed 
below in more detail. At present, member states that favor 
codetermination and other employee participation systems do 
not even attempt to apply their employee participation statutes to 
foreign firms.35 
 
directive to the United Kingdom); see also CATHERINE BARNARD, EC EMPLOYMENT LAW 
707–20 (3d ed. 2006) (providing a detailed discussion of this directive). Collective 
bargaining agreements are governed by the law of the country where the employment 
relationship is executed or the law of the employment contract. See Krebber, supra note 
31, at 537. 
34. Council Directive Establishing a General Framework for Informing and 
Consulting Employees in the European Community, No. 2002/14, 2002 O.J. L 80/29; see 
also BARNARD, supra note 33, at 732–39 (explaining the objectives of the directive). 
35. On Germany, see, for example, CLEMENS JUST, DIE ENGLISCHE LIMITED IN DER 
PRAXIS [THE ENGLISH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY IN PRACTICE] 199–202 (2d ed. 2006) 
(F.R.G.), Marcus Kamp, Die unternehmerische Mitbestimmung nach „Überseering” und „Inspire 
Art” [Codetermination After „Überseering” and „Inspire Art”], 59 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1496, 
1498–99 (2004) (F.R.G.), Klaus J. Müller, Die englische Limited in Deutschland—für welche 
Unternehmen ist sie tatsächlich geeignet? [The English Limited Liability Company in Germany—
For Which Businesses Is It Useful in Practice?], 61 BETRIEBS-BERATER 837, 840 (2006) 
(F.R.G.), Bernd Gach, in 3 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ [MUNICH 
COMMENTARY ON THE STOCK CORPORATION ACT] § 1 MitbestG cmt. 6 (Bruno Kropff & 
Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2004) (F.R.G.), Christoph Teichmann, Restructuring 
Companies in Europe: A German Perspective, 2004 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1325, 1334, and Martin 
Veit & Joachim Wichert, Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung bei europäischen 
Kapitalgesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland nach „Überseering” und „Inspire Art” 
[Codetermination in European Corporations with Headquarters in Germany After „Überseering” 
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1. The Prevalence and Significance of Employee Participation 
Systems 
The system of codetermination in Germany assigns half of 
the seats on the supervisory board of German companies to 
employees36 and is one of the issues that has received the most 
attention in the comparative corporate governance literature.37 
The system of codetermination occupies one end of the 
regulatory spectrum, the other being no employee participation 
at all.38 
Codetermination in the strictest sense of the word requires 
the election of half of the members of the firm’s supervisory 
board by employees39 in firms with more than 2000 employees.40 
The applicable law specifies the precise number of directors that 
 
and „Inspire Art”], 50 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 14, 16–17 (2004) (F.R.G.). For possible 
future “outreach” statutes applying employee participation systems to foreign firms, see 
infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
36. See Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Co-Determination Act], May 4, 1976, 
BGBl. I at 1153, § 7, last amended by Gesetz, July 30, 2009, BGBl. I at 2479, 2491, § 1(1) 
(F.R.G), translated in D. HOFFMAN, THE GERMAN CO-DETERMINATION ACT, 1976 
(MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ 1976) (1976). The law is applicable to all companies outside 
of the coal, mining, and steel industries. Id. § 1(2). These industries are governed by an 
even stricter statute, the Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MontanMitbestG] [Montane 
Co-Determination Act], May 21, 1951, BGBl. I at 347, last amended by Gesetz, October 
31, 2006, BGBl. I at 2407, 2434 (F.R.G.). 
37. See, e.g., Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders 
and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 90, 100–02 
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2009); Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and 
German Securities Markets, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167. 
38. Slovenia, for instance, initially adopted the German version of codetermination 
after gaining independence, but subsequently abandoned it after its constitutional court 
declared the system unconstitutional. See THOMAS RAISER, 
UNTERNEHMENSMITBESTIMMUNG VOR DEM HINTERGRUND EUROPARECHTLICHER 
ENTWICKLUNGEN, GUTACHTEN B FÜR DEN 66. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG [WORKER 
BOARD-LEVEL PARTICIPATION AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT, 
REPORT B FOR THE 66TH MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF GERMAN JURISTS], B 42–B 43 
(2006) (F.R.G.); Rado Bohinc & Stephan M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance in Post-
Privatized Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 58–60 (2001). 
39. See MitbestG § 10. German law and the laws of various other countries in the 
European Union (“EU”) require stock corporations to have dual board system 
comprised of a management board, or Vorstand, whose members are the senior 
managers of the firm, and a supervisory board, or Aufsichtsrat, whose members are 
outside directors. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. 
I at 1089, §§ 76–116, last amended by Gesetz, July 31, 2009, BGBl. I at 2509 (F.R.G.), 
translated in THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (Hannes Schneider & Martin 
Heidenhain trans., 2d ed. Kluwer Law Int’l 2000). 
40. See MitbestG §1(1), ¶2. 
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will comprise the supervisory board according to the size of the 
firm.41 A minority among these directors are not employees of 
the firm, but representatives of unions.42 In the case of a tied 
vote, the vote of the president of the board, a shareholder 
representative, is decisive, putting the representatives of capital at 
an advantage.43 Nevertheless, codetermination strengthens the 
position of labor by facilitating access to information and the 
possibility to grant and withhold assent to important corporate 
decisions, most of all regarding the composition of the 
management board.44 A more moderate employee participation 
scheme applies in firms with 500 to 2000 employees, in which 
employee representatives fill only one-third of the board seats.45 
The German system of codetermination is far from unique 
in the European Union. Although Britain, perhaps the most 
shareholder-centric European corporate jurisdiction today, 
famously rejected what it touted as “industrial democracy” in the 
1970s,46 employee participation systems giving one-third of the 
seats on the board to employees exist in countries such as 
Austria,47 Denmark,48 Finland,49 Luxemburg,50 and Sweden,51 as 
 
41. See id. § 7(1). 
42. See id. § 7(2). 
43. See id. § 29. 
44. Enriques et al., surpa note 37, at 101. 
45. See Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [One-Third Employee Representation Act], May 
18, 2004, BGBl. I at 974, last amended by Gesetz, July 30, 2009, BGBl. I. at 2479, § 1 
(F.R.G.). 
46. A codetermination system comparable to the German one was recommended 
in the “Bullock Report.” REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY, 1977, Cmnd. 6706 (U.K.). For the reasons on why it was rejected, see, for 
example, HERMAN KNUDSEN, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE 53 (1995), and David 
Marsh & Gareth Locksley, Capital in Britain: Its Structural Power and Influence over Policy, 6 
WEST EUR. POL. 36, 49–50 (1983). 
47. See Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz [ArbVG] [Labor Constitution Act], 
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB1 I] No. 22/1974, § 110 (Austria). 
48. RAISER, supra note 38, at B 43–B 44. Regarding the Danish system, see 
KNUDSEN, supra note 46, at 81–95, and Jesper Lau Hansen, The Danish Green Paper on 
Company Law Reform—Modernising Company Law in the 21st Century, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV. 73, 89–90 (2009). 
49. See Laki yhteistoiminnasta yrityksissä [Act on Cooperation with Undertakings] 
(1978:725) (Fin.). A unofficial translation by the Finnish government is electronically 
available at http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/E9780725.pdf. 
50. See Law of May 6, 1974, Mémorial du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg [Official 
Gazette of Luxembourg], A-No. 35, May 10, 1974, at 620 (Lux.). 
51. See 32 § Lag om Medbestämmande i arbetslivet [Act on Codetermination in the 
Workplace] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1976:580) (Swed.), translated in FOLKE 
SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (1977). 
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well as in post-Communist states such as the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, and Hungary.52 Many of these states reserve 
one-third of the seats on the board to employees.53 Notably, 
Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, and Sweden have one-tier board 
systems with varying proportions of seats being assigned to 
employees.54 Large Dutch firms are subject to the structure 
regime known as structuurregime,55 in which one-third of the 
shareholder-elected supervisory board is nominated by the works 
council.56 Until statutory reform in 2004, Dutch board members 
were appointed under a system of “controlled co-optation.”57 
The overall efficiency of employee participation is 
contested. While some scholars have found that it depresses 
shareholder value (which may not necessarily mean that the 
system is inefficient overall),58 other studies have suggested that 
moderate forms have a beneficial effect on Tobin’s q59 in certain 
 
52. See RAISER, supra note 38, at B 42. The idea likely spread to these post-
communist countries because their legal tradition has historically been influenced by 
Germany. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants—Legal Families and the 
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1813, 1867. 
53. See RAISER, supra note 38, at B 42. 
54. See id. at B 43–B 44. 
55. See Abe de Jong & Alisa Roëll, Financing and Control in the Netherlands: A 
Historical Perspective, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 
467, 473 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (discussing the aim of structurregime and its 
drawbacks). See generally STEVEN R. SCHUIT ET AL., CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
THE NETHERLANDS 111–14 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the corporate structure of “large” 
Dutch corporations); Edo Groenewald, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: From the 
Verdam Report of 1964 to the Tabaksblat Code of 2003, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 291, 294 
(2005) (providing a breakdown of the statutory two-tier regime). To qualify as a “large” 
company, a firm must meet three criteria: (1) an equity capital of at least €13,000,000; 
(2) the corporation or a dependent company must have established a Works Council (as 
required by law); and (3) a regular workforce of 100 or more persons in the 
Netherlands (together with dependent companies). See Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW2] 
[Civil Code] bk. 2, tit. 5, arts. 153(2), 263(2) (Neth.). There are several exemptions to 
this definition. For example, a dependent firm with a parent company that fulfills the 
requirements is exempt. See SCHUIT ET AL., supra, at 115–17. 
56. See BW2 [Civil Code] bk. 2, tit. 5, art. 158(6). A rejection of the nominees of 
the works council is only possible for a limited number of reasons. See Groenewald, supra 
note 55, at 295 (describing the grounds for the shareholders to object to a nominee of 
the works council). 
57. Groenewald, supra note 55, at 297. 
58. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor and the Firm: A Study of 
German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863, 885–86 (2004). 
59. Tobin’s q, as it is referred, is the ratio between the firm’s market value and the 
replacement value of its assets. See, e.g., James Tobin & William C. Brainard, Asset Markets 
and the Cost of Capital, in ECONOMIC PROGRESS, PRIVATE VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 235 
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industries60 or that its introduction is correlated with gains in 
productivity.61 The conclusions of these studies are limited by 
their use of a measure of shareholder wealth as a dependent 
variable, while possible rents to employees—which are difficult to 
quantify—should in principle figure into the efficiency calculus.62 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that codetermination and other 
employee participation systems contribute to the maintenance of 
social peace and good employment relations.63 Consequently, 
employee participation models, like the system of 
codetermination, may therefore have an indirect benefit for 
firms that are not captured by econometric studies. As noted 
earlier, even if the potential efficiency benefits are unconvincing, 
it seems clear that employee representation has important 
distributive consequences, as it will at least enhance the 
bargaining power of employees and thus entail a marginal 
increase in rents accruing to labor. 
2. Negotiations About Employee Representation 
In order to subject a company to the law of a member state 
other than the one under which it was originally founded, 
shareholders in practice must avail themselves of specific 
instruments of EU law that impose restrictions on ex post 
changes to employee participation systems. The main instrument 
for reincorporation is the cross-border merger as contemplated 
by the Council Directive on Cross-Border Mergers.64 Under this 
 
(William Fellner et al. eds., 2d ed. 1977). It is frequently used to measure how much 
wealth a firm generates for its shareholders compared to other firms. 
60. See Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 17, at 675. These results do not hold when the 
employee representatives do not actually work in the firm, but are sent by unions. See id. 
at 710. 
61. See generally Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and 
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 233, 242–44 (2005). 
62. Conceivably, there could be other consequences, such as helping society to 
become more egalitarian, which are even more difficult to assess from the perspective of 
utility-maximization. See RAISER, supra note 38, at 49–50 (criticizing econometric studies 
for leaving these aspects aside). 
63. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 214 (1994) 
(“[C]odetermination affects corporate governance in the supervisory board, impeding 
intermediaries from pushing for rapid organizational change that would disrupt 
employment.”). 
64. Council Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, No. 
2005/56, 2005 O.J. L 310/1. 
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instrument, a shell subsidiary is set up in the target member state, 
followed by a merger between the original and the new entity. 
Another potential path to a different member state’s law is 
the creation of an SE through a merger under the SE Statute.65 
While the SE is a corporation governed by EU law, the SE Statute 
provides a rather shallow regulatory framework;66 gaps are filled 
by special national legislation governing SEs with their registered 
office in the respective member state, and failing that, by 
national provisions applicable to public limited liability 
companies.67 As a result, there are a number of British, Czech, 
French, Swedish, and other SEs that are all to a large extent 
governed by the respective national law.68 Since article 8 of the 
SE Statute explicitly allows the transfer of the SE’s registered 
office without initiating a winding up of the firm,69 national 
obstacles to reincorporations can be overcome with relative 
ease.70 However, for a previously existing purely national firm, 
the route to a foreign type of SE is, again, to create a shell 
company in the target member state and then merge with it, in 
this case under the SE Statute. 
The Directive on the Involvement of Employees in the SE71 
sets up a negotiating procedure that must be followed before the 
SE can be registered.72 Employees from both companies merging 
into the new SE must elect or appoint a “special negotiating 
body” (“SNB”) to settle employee representation rights in the 
future SE with the competent bodies of the merging 
 
65. Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, No. 2157/2001, 
arts. 17–31, 2001 O.J. L 294/1, at 7–10. See generally Luca Enriques, Silence is Golden: The 
European Company as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 77 (2004) 
(discussing how the Societas Europaea (“SE”) can be used for company law arbitrage). 
66. See Enriques, supra note 65, at 77 (noting that the statute is limited in scope). 
67. Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, No. 2157/2001, 
art. 9, 2001 O.J. L 294/1, at 6. 
68. A recent study found a total of 213 of these companies. See Horst Eidenmüller 
et al., Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal 
Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 20 (2009). 
69. Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, No. 2157/2001, 
art. 8, 2001 O.J. L 294/1, at 5–6. 
70. See Enriques, supra note 65, at 81–82. 
71. Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with 
Regard to the Involvement of Employees, No. 2001/86, 2001 O.J. L 294/22. 
72. For a detailed description of this directive, see BARNARD, supra note 33, at 723–
32. 
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companies.73 Negotiations should normally be concluded within 
six months, but the parties may agree to extend this period to a 
year.74 National legislatures are required to establish standard 
rules in the event that negotiations break down.75 In the case of 
an SE created by a cross-border merger, this provision applies by 
operation of law when at least twenty-five percent of the 
employees of the merging firms participated in some type of 
employee representation system.76 However, they also apply when 
a smaller number of employees were subject to such a system, 
and when the SNB passes a resolution to that effect.77 The 
standard rules must conform to a “highest level” principle, 
meaning that the proportion of employees on the board must 
correspond to the “most advanced” system before the merger.78 
Even employees previously not covered by an employee 
participation system at all must have this level of participation 
rights after the conclusion of the merger.79 
While the applicable law is that of the state in which the SE 
is registered, all member states (including those without 
mandatory employee representation rules for purely national 
companies) are required to develop a default employee 
participation system for SEs.80 These rules must stipulate that the 
highest proportion of employee participation of any of the 
participating firms applies to the SE resulting from the merger.81 
 
73. See Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with 
Regard to the Involvement of Employees, No. 2001/86, arts. 3–4, 2001 O.J. L 294/22, at 
24–26. Article 4(2) sets out the issues the agreement must cover, such as the allocation 
of seats and the powers of the representative body. Id. art. 4(2). 
74. See id, art. 5, 2001 O.J. L 294/22, at 27. 
75. See id. annex (setting out the fundamental principles of these rules). 
76. See id. annex, pt. 3(b); see also BARNARD, supra note 33, at 730; Paul L. Davies, 
Workers on the Board of the European Company? 32 INDUS. L.J. 75, 85–87 (2003) (explaining 
the “highest level” requirement). 
77. See Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with 
Regard to the Involvement of Employees, No. 2001/86, art. 7(2)(b), 2001 O.J. L 294/22, 
at 27. 
78. See id. art. 7. 
79. BARNARD, supra note 33, at 730. 
80. See Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with 
Regard to the Involvement of Employees, No. 2001/86, pmbl. ¶¶ 3–4, 2001 O.J. L 
294/22, at 22. 
81. See id. annex, pt. 3(b). According to article 7(3), member states may provide 
that the default provisions do not apply if the SE is formed by merger. Id. art. 7(3). This 
provision was introduced in order to secure Spain’s approval of the directive. According 
to the predominant interpretation of the provision, an SE cannot be formed in the 
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Slightly modified rules apply under the Directive on Cross-
Border Mergers. As a general principle, the law applicable at the 
registered office of the entity resulting from the merger governs 
employee participation.82 However, there are three exceptions: 
first, negotiations are mandatory when one of the merging 
companies has an employee participation system and more than 
500 employees; second, when national law applicable after the 
merger does not provide the same level of employee 
representation to employees that were previously subject to such 
a regime; and third, when the postmerger law discriminates 
against employees employed in another member state by not 
granting equivalent representation rights.83 
Regarding cases of mandatory negotiations, the Cross-
Border Mergers Directive refers to the respective provisions of 
the SE Regulation and SE Employees Directive.84 However, the 
threshold for automatic application of the “standard rules” in 
this case is thirty-three and one-third percent.85 Furthermore, 
employee representation in a one-tier board may be limited to 
one third of the positions, even if the merged firm previously 
applied parity codetermination on the supervisory board.86 
 
absence of an agreement with the SNB if the member state refused to adopt the default 
provisions in the formation of an SE through merger. See Paul Davies, Employee 
Involvement in the European Company, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY: DEVELOPING A 
COMMUNITY LAW OF CORPORATIONS 67, 67 n.2 (Jonathan Rickford ed., 2003); Jonathan 
Rickford, Inaugural Lecture—The European Company, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra, 
13, 28 n.56; Ger van der Sangen, The European Company and the Involvement of Employees, 
in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CROSS-BORDER 
REORGANISATIONS FROM A LEGAL AND TAX PERSPECTIVE 169, 199 (S.H.M.A. Dumoulin et 
al. eds., 2005). The United Kingdom did not elect to use this option, but instead 
provides that the standard rules apply in the case of a merger. See European Public 
Limited-Liability Company Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/2326, c. 6, § 33(3) (U.K.). 
82. See Council Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, 
No. 2005/56, art. 16(1), 2005 O.J. L 310/1, at 7. 
83. See id. art. 16(2); see also Arianna Ugliano, The New Cross-Border Merger Directive: 
Harmonisation of European Company Law and Free Movement, 2007 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 585, 
609. 
84.  See Council Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, 
No. 2005/56, art. 16(3), 2005 O.J. L 310/1, at 8. 
85. See id. art. 16(3)(e). 
86. See id. art. 16(4)(c). The rationale seems to be that employee influence on a 
one-tier board is thought to be more significant than on a supervisory board, which is 
less directly involved in the firm’s decision-making processes. See Mathias Habersack, 
Grundsatzfragen der Mitbestimmung in SE und SCE sowie bei grenzüberschreitender 
Verschmelzung [Fundamental Issues of Codetermination in the European Company and the 
European Cooperative, as well as After a Cross-border Merger], 171 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS 
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The European Union has debated the introduction of a 
directive on the cross-border transfer of a firm’s registered office 
(the “14th Directive”) for many years, but the project has been 
shelved since late 2007, at least for the time being.87 The ECJ 
determined in the recently decided Cartesio case that a member 
state may prohibit companies governed by its law from relocating 
the firm’s real seat to another member state while retaining its 
character as a company under the laws of the origin state. 
However, a member state may not prevent a company from 
converting into a company governed by the law of another state 
as long as the latter will accept the firm.88 Without a directive, 
however, a change of the national law applicable to the firm is 
wrought with great difficulty.89 It is usually thought that if the 
14th Directive is ever passed, it will include comparable 
provisions regarding employee representation.90 Since a transfer 
of seat involves only a single company, the codetermination 
 
GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 613, 626 (2007) (F.R.G.); Olaf Kisker, 
Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung in der Europäischen Gesellschaft, der Europäischen 
Genossenschaft und bei grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung im Vergleich [Codetermination in 
the European Company, the European Cooperative, and after Cross-Border Mergers in 
Comparison]‚ 59 RECHT DER ARBEIT 206, 210 (2006) (F.R.G.). 
87. See Stephan Rammeloo, The 14th EC Company Law Directive on the Cross-Border 
Transfer of the Registered Office of Limited Liability Companies—Now or Never?, 15 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 359, 372–73 (2008). 
88. Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, Case C-210/06, [2008] ECR I-9641, ¶¶ 110–
13; see also Gert-Jan Vossestein, Cross-Border Transfer of Seat and Conversion of Companies 
under the EC Treaty Provisions on Freedom of Establishment, 6 EUR. COMPANY L. 115, 120 
(2009). In other words, member states may voluntarily take their own laws out of the 
market for corporations, but must not inhibit competitive actions by other states. See 
Rammeloo, supra note 87, at 368–71. 
89. It is very plausible that provisions of the SE Regulation on the transfer of seat 
would apply by analogy, which might require negotiations about employee participation. 
See Georg Eckert, Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften nach der Cartesio-Entscheidung des EuGH 
[Transfer of a Company’s Real Seat Under the Cartesio Decision of the ECJ], 2009 DER 
GESELLSCHAFTER 139, 149–53 (Austria). 
90. See, e.g., Maureen Johnson, Does Europe Still Need a Fourteenth Company Law 
Directive, 3 HERTFORDSHIRE L.J. 18, 38 (2005) (noting that a new company law directive, 
if adopted, will provide for employee participation); see also Federico M. Mucciarelli, 
Corporate ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited, 9 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 267, 300 (2008) (suggesting that a “corporate mobility” directive should 
have similar safeguards as the cross-border mergers directive); Marco Ventoruzzo, “Cost-
Based” and “Rules-Based” Regulatory Competition: Markets for Corporate Charters in the U.S. 
and the E.U., 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 91, 149 (2006) (same); Eddy Wymeersch, Is a Directive 
on Corporate Mobility Needed?, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 168 (2007) (same);. 
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regime of the state of origin would most likely apply unless the 
SNB agrees to reduce employee participation.91 
3. Codetermination Arbitrage Opportunities 
The rules governing employee participation in the SE and 
Cross-Border Mergers directives are complex, and, in theory, rely 
on a “before-after” principle that is intended to maintain 
previous codetermination structures unless the SNB agrees to a 
reduction or complete elimination in the percentage of labor-
appointed board members. Because of these rules, some 
commentators have concluded that employee participation 
systems are still entrenched following the introduction of the 
transnational merger mechanisms under secondary EU law.92 
Furthermore, the requirement to negotiate with employees has 
been said to shield codetermination regimes against regulatory 
competition because the prospect of including English 
employees in the codetermination process can act as a deterrent 
against transnational mergers involving larger English firms 
(presumably because English managers would not like it).93 This 
latter concern does not pose an obstacle in the case of a true 
reincorporation, where an English firm is set up as a target firm 
for a merger with its German parent or sister, because a merger 
into a newly created English firm could be used to eliminate 
codetermination after the expiration of three years, as specified 
under English law.94 
In fact, there are various ways how controlling shareholders 
can use the opportunities provided by cross-border mergers and 
SEs to restructure labor representation on the board in 
 
91. See Andrew Johnston, EC Freedom of Establishment, Employee Participation in 
Corporate Governance and Regulatory Competition, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 71, 107 (2006). 
92. See, e.g., id. 106–07. 
93. See id. at 109. 
94. See The Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2974, 
art. 40, ¶ 1 (U.K.) (providing that subsequent domestic mergers must not affect 
employee participation rights before the end of a period of three years after the cross-
border merger took effect); see also Georg Eckert & Matthias Schimka, Die 
Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung bei grenzüberschreitenden Verschmelzungen nach dem EU-VerschG 
[Employee Participation Folllowing Cross-border Mergers According to the Cross-Border-Mergers 
Act], 22 WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTLICHE BLÄTTER 201, 210 (2008) (Austria) (pointing out that 
subsequent mergers of the company resulting from the initial cross-border merger with 
a new entity of the same nationality are governed by that country’s law); Habersack, 
supra note 86, at 637 (same). 
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idiosyncratic ways. This is illustrated by the proposed takeover of 
Volkswagen AG (“VW”) by Porsche SE that seemed imminent in 
late 2008. While the bid stalled in spring 2009, when Porsche 
became starved for cash due to the world financial crisis,95 
Porsche’s original plans illustrate interesting codetermination 
arbitrage possibilities. VW was shielded from takeover offers by 
the VW-Gesetz (VW Act), which set out a twenty percent voting 
cap and gave the right to appoint directors to the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the State of Lower Saxony as long as 
they held a single share.96 In 2007, the ECJ ruled that this act 
violated the EU freedom of movement of capital.97 As a result of 
the decision, the way was paved for Porsche to acquire a 
controlling share in the company.98 Porsche had recently created 
Porsche Automobil Holding SE, which held 100% of the 
operative Porsche AG.99 Under the parity codetermination 
regime negotiated with Porsche employees when the firm was 
transformed into an SE, three members would have represented 
Porsche employees, and three would have represented VW 
employees on the Porsche SE board after a takeover.100 
 
95. See, e.g., Carter Dougherty, Tables Turn in Porsche’s Pursuit of VW, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2009, at B1; Porsche Aids VW Merger By Selling Stake to Qatar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 
2009, at B2. 
96. Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Private Hand [Law Concerning the 
Privatization of Shares in the Volkswagen Limited Liability Company], July 21, 1960, 
BGBl I at 585, last amended by Gesetz, July 31, 1970, BGBl. I at 1149 (F.R.G.). The state 
of Lower Saxony continues to hold shares in VW, while the Federal Republic of German 
does not. 
97. See Commission v. Germany, C-112/05 [2007] E.C.R. I-8995 [hereinafter 
Volkswagen]; see also Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European 
Corporate Law: Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1027, 1034–42 
(2007) (discussing the Volkswagen case); Jonathan Rickford, Free Movement of Capital and 
Protectionism After Volkswagen and Viking Line, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 61, 76–83 (Michel Tison et al. eds., 2009) (examining the 
effects of Volkswagen). The court rejected Germany’s argument that the law could be 
justified by invoking the interests of employees. See Volkswagen, [2007] E.C.R. I-8995, ¶ 
70; see also Erik Werlauff, Safeguards Against Takeover After Volkswagen—On the Lawfulness 
of Such Safeguards Under Company Law After the European Court’s Decision in “Volkswagen,” 
2009 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 101, 108. 
98. See Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 97, at 1047. 
99. See Press Release, Porsche AG, Porsche Enters the Future with a New Corporate 
Structure (June 26, 2007), http://www.porsche.com/usa/aboutporsche/pressreleases/
pag/archive2007/quarter2/?pool=international-de&id=2007-06-26_02 (announcing the 
approval of a holding structure in the form of a parent SE entity). 
100. See Press Release, Porsche AG, Parity Representation on Supervisory Board of 
Porsche Automobil Holding SE (June 26, 2007), http://www.porsche.com/usa/
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Unsurprisingly, VW employee representatives strongly opposed 
the agreement, given that its workforce of 324,000 dwarfed 
Porsche’s mere 12,000 employees.101 VW employee 
representatives sought to block the registration of Porsche SE,102 
but the competent German court in Stuttgart refused to issue a 
preliminary injunction in fall 2007.103 The same court 
subsequently ruled in spring 2008 that the there was no legal 
ground for VW’s works council to request a rescission of the 
agreement between Porsche and its employee representatives, 
partly because Porsche had not yet acquired control of VW.104 
As a consequence of the unexpected outcome in this matter, 
courts did not have the opportunity to resolve the lingering 
question of whether a renegotiation of the employee 
participation agreement would be required. Recital 18 of the 
preamble to the SE Directive establishes the “before and after” 
principle, which is intended to guarantee employee rights not 
only in the case of the formation of an SE, but also in the case of 
later “structural changes.”105 However, in the case of the 
acquisition of a subsidiary, renegotiations are not required either 
by the Directive or under German law,106 and it is not clear how 
 
aboutporsche/pressreleases/pag/archive2007/quarter2/
?pool=international-de&id=2007-06-26_03 (outlining the details of the employee 
participation agreement in the new SE entity); see also Press Release, Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE, Porsche Automobil Holding SE Sets the First Benchmark (July 25, 2007), 
http://www.porsche.com/usa/aboutporsche/pressreleases/pag/archive2007/
quarter3/?pool=international-de&id=2007-07-25 (listing the members of Porsche SE’s 
supervisory board). 
101. See, e.g., Mark Landler, Porsche to Wait Until Holidays End to Take Over 
Volkswagen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at C3. 
102. See id. 
103. Arbeitsgericht Stuttgart [Stuttgart Labor Court], Oct. 24, 2007, No. 12 BVGa 
4/07 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.arbg-stuttgart.de/servlet/PB/show/1213597/12-
BVGa-4-07; see also Zumbansen & Saam, supra note 97, at 1049–51 (providing detailed 
background information surrounding the case). 
104. Arbeitsgericht Stuttgart, April 29, 2008, No. 12 BV 109/07 (F.R.G.), available 
at http://www.jum.baden-wuerttemberg.de/servlet/PB/show/1222314/
12-BV-109-07.pdf. 
105. Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with 
Regard to the Involvement of Employees, No. 2001/86, pmbl. ¶ 18, 2001 O.J. L 294/22, 
at 23. 
106. German law allows the management of an SE or its works council to request 
renegotiations in the case of a planned structural change that may result in the 
reduction of employee’s participation rights, but without providing a definition, 
examples, or mentioning the acquisition of new subsidiaries, the consequence of which 
is to deprive employees of the subsidiary of codetermination in the controlling entity. See 
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German courts would deal with reorganization of ownership 
structures.107 Naturally, Porsche’s employee representatives saw 
little reason to negotiate on behalf of workers from another firm 
that was expected to become part of the Porsche group. 
The case illustrates that controlling shareholders might use 
arbitrage opportunities by playing different labor groups against 
each other—by reducing the rights of powerful groups of 
employees to the benefit of more manageable ones. Other 
German publicly traded firms have managed to substantially alter 
codetermination by creating an SE. For example, the Allianz 
insurance group reduced the size of the supervisory board by 
merging with an Italian subsidiary.108 BASF also managed to 
change its employee participation system by transforming into an 
SE, although one of the professed motives in this case was 
apparently to assure better representation of employees outside 
Germany.109 
There are further possibilities of reducing the participation 
regime for particular employee groups without their assent that 
can be used to install a weaker employee participation system. 
The formation of an SE makes the result of the negotiations 
permanent for the duration of the entity’s existence unless 
national law requires renegotiation.110 Moreover, since national 
rules on employee participation are overruled by the 
 
Gesetz über die Beteiligung der Arbeitnehmer in einer Europäischen Gesellschaft [SE-
BG] [SE Participation Law], Dec. 22, 2004, BGBl. I at 3686 § 18(3) (F.R.G.). But see 
ArbVG, BGB1 I No. 22/1974, § 228(2) (Austria); (recognizing a change in the number 
of employees, including subsidiaries, as a legal ground for renegotiation); Code du 
Travail [C. TRAV.] [Labor Code] art. L. 2354-4 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH 
COMMERCIAL CODE IN ENGLISH (Philip Raworth trans., rev. ed. 2009) (same, but without 
reference to subsidiary entities). U.K. law lacks an equivalent provision. See European 
Public Limited-Liability Company Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/2326, c. 6, § 33(3) 
(U.K.). 
107. See, e.g., Habersack, supra note 86, 641–42 (pointing out that the purchase of 
sale of a subsidiary or business establishment does not result in a revitalization of the 
negotiation procedure). 
108. See CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM 85 (2008); 
Enriques et al., supra note 36, at 55, 70. In Allianz, the motivation to create an SE 
primarily seems to have been the desire to merge with its Italian subsidiary, with changes 
to governance structure as a byproduct. See ALLIANZ GROUP, ALLIANZ GROUP ANNUAL 
REPORT 2006, at 91 (2006), http://annualreport.allianz.com/ar06/en/pdf/
AZ_GB_e_088-099.pdf. 
109. See Jochem Reichert, Experience with the SE in Germany, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 22, 
27 (2008). 
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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participation agreement, additional requirements that are 
contingent on changes to the structure of the corporation no 
longer apply. For example, a German firm that crosses the 
threshold of 2000 employees is not required to increase the 
number of employee members on its supervisory board from one 
third to one half (as it would otherwise be).111 SEs can also be 
created as joint parent firms, or through cleverly structured 
mergers, and altogether avoid the necessity to negotiate with 
employees.112 
Notably, article 11 of the SE Employees Directive requires 
states to take appropriate measures against the misuse of the SE 
corporate form for the purpose of depriving employees of rights 
to employee involvement.113 However, the directive neither 
defines the term “misuse” nor explains appropriate measures. 
Most likely, these measures will also be subject the four-factor test 
set out by the ECJ in Gebhard.114 Certain reorganizations that 
ultimately reduce or eliminate employee participation may well 
be considered a legitimate use of the freedom of establishment 
by the ECJ.115 Some authors have even suggested that a market 
for “shelf SEs” without employee participation might develop, 
which would be ready for use in a merger with a firm governed 
by the law of a codetermination-friendly country.116 Before the 
 
111. Markus Rehberg, Die missbräuchliche Verkürzung der unternehmerischen 
Mitbestimmung durch die Societas Europaea [The Abusive Reduction of Employee Participation by 
the Societas Europaea], 34 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
859, 861 (2005) (F.R.G.). 
112. See id. at 861–62 (providing a number of possibilities). 
113. Council Directive Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with 
Regard to the Involvement of Employees, No. 2001/86, art. 11, 2001 O.J. L 294/22, at 
28. 
114. See Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano, Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 37 (requiring that national measures 
hindering the exercise of the freedoms “must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and 
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”). Thus, broad-sweeping 
laws that restrict companies solely on the basis that they incorporate in another member 
state are impermissible. See Rehberg, supra note 111, at 876. 
115. See, e.g., Bodo Riegger, Centros-Überseering–Inspire Art: Folgen für die Praxis 
[Centros-Überseering–Inspire Art: Practical Implications], 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 510, 521 (2004) (F.R.G.). 
116. See Rehberg, supra note 111, at 863; Paul Storm, Cross-Border Mergers, the Rule of 
Reason and Employee Participation, 3 EUR. COMPANY L. 130, 135 (2006); see also Bratton et 
al., supra note 11, at 365 (finding that twenty-seven percent of SEs are shelf companies). 
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ECJ has the opportunity to breathe life into article 11, its 
interpretation will largely be left to national legislators. Given 
that the law of the “target country” applies to the new SE, 
shareholders may use the creation process to make sure that the 
newly founded SE is subject to the law of a member state that is 
relatively hostile to employee participation. As seen in the case of 
VW and Porsche, not even German law appears to provide 
comprehensive protection against such a process. 
The most important factor ultimately permitting a 
downscaling or even elimination of employee participation seems 
to be future structural changes to a firm. The SE Regulation 
allows SEs to be converted into a public limited-liability company 
governed by the law of the state of registration two years after its 
formation.117 A German corporation might, for example, 
transform into an SE by merging with its British subsidiary, and 
convert into a traditional British company without any employee 
participation after two years. Such a conversion would most likely 
not be considered a “misuse.” Even if the German authorities 
believed that it did, they would be unable to act on that belief 
because British law would apply to the company at that time.118 
Moreover, it is not clear whether the two-year waiting period 
for a conversion would also apply to mergers or other structural 
changes involving a corporation governed by national law.119 
Austrian, German, and U.K. lawmakers did not assume that it 
would be, given that the laws of these countries presume misuse 
only for structural change taking place within one year after the 
formation of the SE.120 Irrespective of when a merger within one 
member state with a “fresh” company is permissible, article 11 is 
 
117. Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, No. 2157/2001, 
art 66(1), 2001 O.J. L 294/1, at 17. 
118. See Friedrich Kübler, Mitbestimmungsfeindlicher Missbrauch der Societas Europaea? 
[Abuse of the Societas Europaea that is hostile to codetermination?], in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
THOMAS RAISER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 20. FEBRUAR 2005 247, 254 (Reinhard Damm 
et al. eds., 2005) (F.R.G.); Kisker, supra note 86, at 208. 
119. See Carsten Schäfer, VO (EWG) 2157/2001 Art. 66, comment 14, in 9/2 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 764, 766 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes 
Semler eds., 2d ed. 2006) (F.R.G.) (arguing that article 66(1) should apply by analogy, 
but citing other authors that do not share this view). 
120. See ArbVG, BGB1 I No. 22/1974, § 229(1) (Austria); SE-BG, Dec. 22, 2004, 
BGBl. I at 3686, § 43 (F.R.G.); European Public Limited-Liability Company Regulations 
2004, S.I. 2004/2326, c. 6, § 35(2) (U.K.); see also Storm, supra note 116, at 135 
(reporting that seven member states had implemented this rule). 
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not likely to preempt employees from being deprived of 
participation rights. As in the case of a conversion, it is up to the 
state where the SE is registered to implement and interpret the 
prohibition against misuse, and to decide whether new 
negotiations or other measure are necessary to protect them.121 
While a number of countries have introduced criminal sanctions 
for “misuses,”122 the more fundamental issue is the interpretation 
of the term. While the final arbiter—both for its interpretation123 
and whether a member state has introduced appropriate 
measures against it—is of course the ECJ, some member states 
are likely to assess potential misuses more favorably than others 
in the short-term. 
The Directive on Cross-Border Mergers requires member 
states to protect employee participation rights in the event of 
subsequent domestic mergers for a period of three years.124 While 
some commentators have suggested that the directive requires a 
resumption of negotiations in such instances,125 both German 
and Austrian law provide that the agreement reached in the 
original negotiations applies to firms resulting from subsequent 
mergers unless the respective national participation regime 
would be stricter.126 Since the firm resulting from a subsequent 
domestic merger is a creature of the state of incorporation, it is 
effectively up to the law of the “target state” to shield negotiated 
employee participation from subsequent opportunism. While 
French, German, and U.K. law retain the three-year period 
 
121. See Adam Sagan, The Misuse of a European Company according to Article 11 of the 
Directive 2001/86/EC, 2010 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 15, 37. 
122. In Germany, a “misuse” can even be penalized with a prison sentence of up to 
two years. See SE-BG, Dec. 22, 2004, BGBl. I at 3686, § 45(1), ¶ 2 (F.R.G.); see also 
Rehberg, supra note 111, at 890 (criticizing these criminal sanctions as constitutionally 
problematic in light of the term’s vagueness); Sagan, supra note 121, at 35 (listing eleven 
countries in which misuse is subject to criminal sanctions). 
123. See Sagan, supra note 121, at 28–35 (providing some guidance for the 
interpretation of the term). 
124. See Council Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability 
Companies, No. 2005/56, art. 16(7), 2005 O.J. L 310/1, at 8; see also Edward Rock et al., 
Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 36, at 183, 217–
18. 
125. Habersack, supra note 86, at 637–38. 
126. See Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer bei einer 
grenzüberschreitenden Verschmelzung [MgVG] [Law on the Participation of Employees 
in a Cross-Border Merger], Dec. 21, 2006, BGBl. I at 3332, last amended by Gesetz, July 
30, 2009, BGBl. I at 2479, § 30 (F.R.G.); ArbVG, BGB1 I No. 22/1974, § 262 (Austria). 
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contemplated by the Directive, Austrian law mandates a five-year 
window.127 However, EU law does not explicitly preclude member 
states from allowing firms to eradicate the negotiated result by 
means of a simple merger with a “fresh” corporate entity not 
subject to employee participation after the expiry of the three-
year period.128 
The SE Regulation adopts a “real seat” approach by 
requiring the registered office to be in the same member state as 
the head office.129 A company that transfers its registered office 
to another state (thus changing the applicable national law) must 
relocate its head office as well or risk severe sanctions, including 
liquidation.130 By contrast, the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers 
offers better legal arbitrage opportunities because it applies to 
“regular” companies governed by national law,131 which, 
according to the ECJ, must be permitted to convert into a 
company governed by the law of another member state without 
losing their identity if the state into which they seek to 
“immigrate” allows it.132 As a consequence, the member states 
must allow firms to emigrate, even if they are void of any 
employee participation as a result of a series of mergers. 
There is some corresponding speculation as to whether EU 
law would permit member states to implement “outreach 
statutes” that apply national codetermination systems to foreign 
firms with a significant presence or with their “real seat” in the 
local jurisdiction. Such a statute would then also theoretically 
apply to companies emerging from cross-border mergers. 
Politically, the enactment of such a statute does not presently 
seem very likely even in Germany.133 Moreover, such a statute 
 
127. Compare C. TRAV. art. L. 2374-2 (Fr.) (three years), and MgVG § 30 (F.R.G.) 
(same), and The Companies (Cross-Border Mergers) Regulations 2007, 2007 S.I. 
2007/2974, s. 40 (U.K.) (same), with ArbVG § 262 (Austria) (five years). 
128. The ECJ would most likely consider a prohibition of subsequent mergers by 
national law as a violation of the principle of freedom of establishment. It is doubtful 
whether the court would allow a member state to impose an employee participation 
system on “pseudo-foreign” companies for public policy reasons. 
129. See Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, No. 
2157/2001, pmbl. ¶ 27, art. 7, 2001 O.J. L 294/1, at 3–4. 
130. See id. art. 64, 2001 O.J. L 294/1, at 16. 
131. Council Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, 
No. 2005/56, pmbl. ¶¶ 2–3, 2005 O.J. L 310/1, at 1. 
132. Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, Case C-210/06, [2008] ECR I-9641, ¶ 112. 
133. Teichmann, supra note 35, at 1334. 
  
818 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:792 
would have to pass the four-factor Gebhard test.134 Given the ECJ’s 
assessment of creditor protection mechanisms in Inspire Art,135 it 
seems doubtful that employee participation systems would pass 
the court’s strict scrutiny.136 Most analysts seem skeptical that the 
court would consider employee protection goals to be an 
“imperative requirement in the public interest”, and that 
employee participation is a necessary means to attain that goal.137 
 
134. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
135. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
Case C-167/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10155, ¶¶ 136–42. 
136. Cf. Kübler, supra note 118, at 256–57 (arguing that in light of Centros and 
Inspire Art the mere use of a more favorable foreign law cannot be considered a misuse 
by German courts); Sagan, supra note 121, at 30–31 (arguing that the creation of an SE 
as such cannot constitute an abuse by virtue of depriving employees of their right to 
representation). 
137. See, e.g., Alexander Franz, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht und deutsche 
Kapitalgesellschaften im In- bzw. Ausland [Conflict of Laws Relating to Corporations and 
German Corporations in Germany or Abroad], 64 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1250, 1253–54 (2009) 
(F.R.G.); Horst Hammen, Zweigniederlassungsfreiheit europäischer Gesellschaften und 
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer auf Unternehmensebene [Freedom of Branch Establishment of 
European Companies and Company-Level Participation by Employees], 53 WERTPAPIER-
MITTEILUNGEN 2487, 2495 (1999) (F.R.G.); Riegger, supra note 115, at 521; Veit & 
Wichert, supra note 35, at 16–17; see also Friedemann Eberspächer, Unternehmerische 
Mitbestimmung in zugezogenen Auslandsgesellschaften: Regelungsmöglichkeiten des deutschen 
Gesetzgebers [Codetermination in Foreign Companies Moving into Germany: Regulatory Options 
for the German Legislature] 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1951, 1956 (2008) 
(F.R.G.) (considering it possible to impose employee participation in an advisory 
board); Müller, supra note 35, at 841 (arguing that codetermination cannot be 
considered an essential element of ordre public in Germany); Daniel Zimmer, Neue 
Formen der unternehmerischen Mitbestimmung bei In- und Auslandsgesellschaften [New Forms of 
Codetermination in Domestic and Foreign Firms], in EUROPÄISCHE 
AUSLANDSGESELLSCHAFTEN IN DEUTSCHLAND 365, 369–77 (Marcus Lutter ed. 2005) 
(F.R.G.) (doubting that it would be feasible to impose codetermination on foreign firms 
as a matter of legislative technique); Wolfgang Zöllner, Konkurrenz für inländische 
Kapitalgesellschaften durch ausländische Rechtsträger, insbesondere die englische Private Limited 
Company [Competition for Domestic Companies from Foreign Entities, Particularly the English 
Private Limited Company], 97 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU 1, 10 (2006) (F.R.G.) (pointing out that 
German codetermination has always remained exclusive to particular legal forms, which 
is why employee protection can hardly be assessed as requiring such a system or as 
German ordre publique). But see Jens Dammann, Note, The Future of Codetermination 
After Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 632–85 (2003) (arguing that Germany could modify its statute to 
apply to foreign firms); Manfred Weiss & Achim Seifert, Der europarechtliche Rahmen für 
ein „Mitbestimmungserstreckungsgesetz” [The EU Law Framework for a Codetermination 
Extension Act], 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 542, 547 
(2009) (F.R.G.) (suggesting that a limited expansion would be permissible). Another 
recently proposed option that is more likely to pass muster with the ECJ is the 
commencement of negotiation about employee participation systems, as they are 
required by EU law in the SE statute and the cross-border mergers directive. Such a 
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C. Duties of Directors in General and in Takeovers 
Besides employee participation systems, there are several 
other important issues that are potentially relevant for employee 
interests. First are the goals that directors and managers have to 
pursue under the applicable law. Second are the interests that 
managers are required to take into account in takeovers, a 
situation where shareholder and employee interests are often 
pitted against each other. 
1. The Corporate Objective 
In many countries, corporate law typically exhorts directors 
to pursue a certain overarching goal of corporate law and the 
corporation. In theory, the possible regulatory options range 
from relentless maximization of shareholder value to reconciling 
the interests of various groups, including shareholders and 
employees. 
While the law falls between these two extremes, the 
conventional wisdom is that Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions give 
greater weight to shareholder value than others. In reality, the 
distinction is not clear-cut. True, U.K. law now seems to favor 
shareholders after the Companies Act of 2006,138 which endorses 
an “enlightened shareholder value” approach.139 Directors are 
required to have regard to the interests of an enumerative list of 
stakeholders (including employees), but only “to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole.”140 In other words, employee interests are relevant only to 
 
statute might apply to all companies with their real seat in Germany (including German 
firms). See Christoph Teichmann, Verhandelte Mitbestimmung für Auslandsgesellschaften 
[Negotiated Participation for Foreign Companies], 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 
1787, 1787–88 (2009) (F.R.G.). But see Thomas Müller-Bonnani, 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung nach „Überseering” und „Inspire Art” [Codetermination After 
„Überseering” and „Inspire Art”], 94 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU 1235, 1238 (2003) (F.R.G.) 
(arguing that it would be difficult to apply this mechanism to such firms). 
138. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46. 
139. See generally Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis 
of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 
(2007) (contrasting the approach contained in section 172(1) of the 2006 Companies 
Act to the pure shareholder value approach). 
140. Companies Act, 2006, § 172, sched. 1. 
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the extent that they are instrumental to shareholder value.141 
However, the former Companies Acts of 1980 and 1985 required 
directors to have regard to “the interests of the company’s 
employees in general, as well as the interests of its members,”142 
which—while without a doubt suffering from a lack of 
enforceability—could be interpreted as a “pluralist” corporate 
objective approach.143 U.S. law is maybe even less clearly 
shareholder-centric. In spite of the famous “shareholder 
primacy” norm of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,144 the case law has 
remained inconclusive,145 leading some legal scholars to question 
whether the shareholder primacy principle actually applies as a 
matter of legal doctrine.146 The American Law Institute’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance in principle suggest that 
“corporate profit and shareholder gain” should be the objective 
of corporate activity, but also go on to permit deviations from 
 
141. See, e.g., PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN 
COMPANY LAW 507–09 (8th ed. 2008); BRENDA HANNIGAN & DAN PRENTICE, THE 
COMPANIES ACT 2006—A COMMENTARY 31 (2007). The Department of Trade and 
Industry’s White Paper explains that the concept of enlightened shareholder value “is 
most likely to drive long-term company performance and maximise overall 
competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all.” DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 
COMPANY LAW REFORM, 2005, Cm. 6456, at 20–21 (U.K.). 
142. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 309(1); Companies Act 1980, 1980, c. 22, § 46(1); 
see also NIGEL SAVAGE, THE COMPANIES ACT 1980: A NEW BUSINESS CODE (1980). 
143. See, e.g., Paul Davies, Shareholder Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets 
Law: A British View, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 261, 270 (Klaus J. Hopt & 
Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2003) (highlighting directors’ competing duties to both 
shareholders and stakeholders, including employees and creditors, under the previous 
Companies Acts); Ross Grantham, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders, 
57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554, 569–70 (1998) (discussing the directors’ duties created by the 
Companies Acts of 1980 and 1985 as including the interests of shareholders, employees, 
and creditors); Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Companies and Employees: Common Law or 
Social Dimension?, 109 L.Q. REV. 220, 235 (1993) (discussing the controversy over the 
“pluralist” corporate objective standard created by the Companies Acts of 1980 and 
1985). 
144. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The 
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”). 
145. See, e.g., Shlensky v Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776, 180–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) 
(applying the business judgment rule to director’s decision to forego lighting 
installation at a professional baseball diamond despite its potential to increase profits). 
146. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 450 (suggesting that, outside the narrow scope 
of Revlon duties, there is no doctrinal basis for shareholder wealth maximization). See 
generally D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) 
(arguing that the case should be understood as addressing majority-minority conflicts); 
Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 
(2008) (arguing that Dodge is no longer good law). 
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that objective for ethical, humanitarian, or philanthropic 
reasons.147 Even continental laws are not clear-cut because 
pluralist interpretations of the overarching goal of corporate law 
are not in fact required by statute. While this was the case in 
Germany between 1937 and 1965,148 the French intérêt social149 
and the Italian interesse sociale150 are pure products of 
interpretation in their respective pluralist understanding. 
 
147. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994). 
148. See AktG, Jan. 30, 1937, RGBl. I at 107, § 70 (F.R.G.) (requiring directors “to 
manage the corporation as the good of the enterprise and its retinue and the common 
weal [sic] of folk and realm demand”). Such a requirement continues to exist in 
section 70 of Austria’s corporation statute with a less politically loaded wording. AktG, 
BGB1 No. 98/1965, § 70 (Austria). In Germany, the section was removed in the 1965 
act, the legislative materials to which stated that it was self-evident that managers would 
also have to take employee and public interests into account. For the official reasoning 
for the proposal, see BRUNO KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ 97 (1965). For an overview of the 
development of the rule, see Vagts, supra, at 38–43. Cf. Hans-Joachim Mertens, in 2 
KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 76 cmt. 16 (Wolfgang Zöllner et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 1996) (F.R.G.) (stating that the language of the 1937 act was still relevant). The 
German law’s Austrian counterpart includes to this day a rule under which the 
management board is required manage the company as required by the good of the 
enterprise with regard to the interests of stockholders, employees and the public 
interest. AktG § 70 (Austria). 
149. See Christiane Alcouffe, Judges and CEOs: French Aspects of Corporate Governance, 
9 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 127, 133–35 (2000); Philippe Bissara, L’intérêt social [The Social 
Interest], 117 REVUE DES SOCIETES 5, 14 (1999); Didier Danet, Crony capitalism et 
gouvernement d’entreprise [Crony Capitalism and Corporate Governance], 14 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE 247, 273 (2000); Jacques Delga, Éthique, éthique 
d’entreprise, éthique du gouvernement d’entreprise [Ethics, Business Ethics, and Corporate 
Governance Ethics], 1999 LE DALLOZ, chronique 397; Claude Ducouloux-Favard, Trente 
Années d’influence du droit communautaire sûr le droit français des sociétés [Thirty Years of 
Community Law to Influence the Course of French Law Firms], 113 REVUE DES SOCIETES 649, 
657 (1995); Jean Paillusseau, La modernisation du droit des sociétés commerciales [The 
Modernization of Commercial Law], 1996 Recueil Dalloz Sirey, chronique 287, 289; Jean 
Paillusseau, Entreprise, société, actionnaires, salariés, quels rapports? [Business, Society, 
Shareholders, Employees, What Reports?], 1999 RECUEIL DALLOZ, chronique 157, 164–65; 
Joëlle Simon, L’évolution du gouvernement d’entreprise en France [The Evolution of Corporate 
Governance in France], 77 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE 368, 
373 (2000); Didier Poraccchia, La rôle de l’intérêt social dans la société par actions simplifiée 
[The Role of the Social Interest in the Joint Stock Company], 118 REVUE DES SOCIETES 223, 224 
(2000). But see Dominique Schmidt, De l’intérêt social [On the Social Interest], LA SEMAINE 
JURIDIQUE [J.C.P.] I, No. 488 (1995). 
150. See, e.g., PIER GIUSTO JAEGER, L’INTERESSE SOCIALE (1964) (Italy) (providing a 
thorough review of the Italian system). For more recent assessments, see, for example, 
LUCA ENRIQUES, IL CONFLITTO D’INTERESSI DEGLI AMMINISTRATORI DI SOCIETÀ PER 
AZIONI 159–83 (2000) (Italy), and Pier Giusto Jaeger, L’interesse sociale rivisitato 
(quarant’anni dopo) [The Social Interest Revisited (Forty Years Later)], 27 GIURISPRUDENZA 
COMMERCIALE I, 795 (2000) (Italy). 
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In spite of extensive debates in each of these countries, it is 
doubtful whether the orientation of these norms, which might be 
considered the ideological attitude toward the corporate law 
system, is relevant for purposes of regulatory arbitrage. While it 
may be too pessimistic to consider them completely irrelevant, 
their significance is most likely an indirect one that manifests 
itself in subtle differences in the attitude that jurists develop in 
the course of interpreting the law, often even without directly 
referring to such overarching ideals. General principles of 
corporate law influence the interpretation of other rules; courts 
refer to them as guidelines for interpretation, much like the 
German Federal Supreme Court did in the recent Mannesmann 
case regarding executive compensation.151 However, it seems 
doubtful that arbitrage gains from this type of rule will be large 
enough to drive reincorporation decisions. In particular, with the 
exception of the marginal cases that are dealt with by the courts, 
important business decisions will usually be taken upon the 
instigation and with the assent of large shareholders, whose 
interests typically “overrule” corporate objective norms for 
practical purposes.152 
2. Directors’ Duties in Hostile Takeovers 
The most interesting aspect of directors’ duties emerges in 
hostile takeovers, a situation where the interests of shareholder 
 
151. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, 50 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 331 (F.R.G.), 
translated in FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES OF CORPORATE LAW 97 (2006). The 
court explicitly grounded its decision in the concept of Unternehmensinteresse, or interest 
of the business, which is traditionally understood as going beyond the mere interests of 
shareholders. See, e.g., MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 108, at 83–84. However, in this 
particular case the reference to the doctrine was unnecessary to achieve the court’s 
conclusion. 
152. In the United Kingdom, any pluralist inclinations directors may have 
developed as a result of section 309(1) of the 1985 Companies Act were, for practical 
purposes, most likely overruled by the market for corporate control and the risk of 
hostile takeovers under the regime created by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 309(1) (Eng.); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675 (2007) (“U.K. law facilitates the removal of 
directors by shareholders . . . which operate[s] to make boards more accountable and 
more attentive to shareholder interests.”). Apparently the courts never explored how 
the Code related to § 309. Cf. Dawson Int’l plc v Coats Patons plc 1988 S.L.T. 854, 859 
(Sess.) (Scot.) (deciding that directors may agree to have a third party recommend a bid 
to shareholders without violating fiduciary duties and stating that the code does not 
contradict this conclusion). 
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value maximization and employees often clash.153 While hostile 
takeovers have long been of little relevance in continental 
Europe because of concentrated ownership, it is remarkable how 
the principal Anglo-Saxon countries have long occupied 
opposing ends on the regulatory spectrum in this regard. In the 
United States, the threat of hostile takeovers fuelled the 
enactment of laws permitting or requiring managers to take 
nonshareholder constituencies into account in order to justify 
defensive measures against hostile takeovers.154 In more than half 
of all U.S. states, a statute explicitly allows or requires directors to 
take the interests of other constituencies into account, including 
those of shareholders, employees, creditors, bondholders, 
suppliers, and communities.155 In some states, constituency 
statutes are mandatory, whereas in others they are optional or 
require a charter provision.156 Delaware is the most prominent 
absentee, but the state supreme court has found that “the impact 
on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, 
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community 
generally)” is among the concerns the board may take into 
account.157 Subsequent case law effectively gave directors a “just 
 
153. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 34 (Alan J. Auerbach 
ed., 1988) (describing how hostile takeovers may allow shareholders to breach an 
implicit agreement with employees). 
154. Bebchuk and Ferrell argue that U.S. regulatory competition has resulted in a 
race to protect managers from takeovers. Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1177 
(1999). 
155. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False 
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 125–28 (listing a total of thirty-two statutes that allow 
directors to consider the corporation’s continued independence as optimally serving the 
interest of the corporation and its shareholders); John C. Coates IV, Note: State Takeover 
Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 855 
(1989) (discussing the laws that require or allow directors to take constituencies other 
than the shareholders into consideration during the prospective takeover even though 
those laws may not give the non-shareholder constituents a voice in the takeover 
considerations); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-756(d)(3)–(4) (1997) (requiring 
directors to consider stakeholder interests). Of the thirty-two statutes, Nebraska’s was 
repealed in 1995. See Springer, supra, at 95. 
156. See Springer, supra note 155, at 101–02. 
157. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
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say no” defense158 and the ability to effectively shield the firm 
against takeovers.159 
By contrast, the British City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
requires the board to maintain strict neutrality regarding hostile 
bids. It may not “take any action which may result in any offer or 
bona fide possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being 
denied the opportunity to decide on its merits.”160 According to 
Paul Davies, “the directors of the target are thrown back on their 
powers of persuasion.”161 While this difference may not be 
specific to takeover law, and instead a reflection of a different 
general attitude of corporate law towards centralized 
management,162 it is probably the most significant aspect. Several 
commentators have pointed out that U.K. takeover regulations 
give directors “a greater incentive to focus on returns to 
shareholders.”163 
 
158. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?”: Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 516 
(1997). 
159. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (arguing that the “law of 
staggered boards” has given directors the ability to effectively shield the company 
against hostile takeovers). 
160. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS R. 21.1(a) (9th ed. 2009), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf [hereinafter U.K. TAKEOVER CODE]. Before the 
2006 amendments to the code, this general clause was not part of rule 21, but rather 
found in general principle 7 of the code. For a discussion of these amendments, see 
Geoffrey K. Morse, Proposed Amendments to the Takeovers Code to Implement the 13th EC 
Directive, 2006 J. BUS. L. 242. Before the amendments, the takeover code required 
directors to consider not only shareholders’ interests, but also those of employees of 
directors under general principle 9. See PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY 
CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL 
ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES (7th ed. 2002). Moreover, rule 24.1 still requires the bidder to 
disclose its long-term plans and intentions with regard to the firm’s employees. U.K. 
TAKEOVER CODE, supra, R. 24.1. However, as Deakin et al. point out, “these provisions 
do little to counter-balance the specific duties of disclosure owed to shareholders under 
the Code.” Simon Deakin et al., Implicit Contracts, Takeovers and Corporate Governance: In 
the Shadow of the City Code, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTS: DISCRETE, 
RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 289, 299 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003). 
161. DAVIES, supra note 141, at 987. 
162. See Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 36, at 225, 269. 
163. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, 
and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 
1739 (2007); SIMON DEAKIN & FRANK WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET: 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AND LEGAL EVOLUTION 337 (2005). 
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While many U.S. scholars are skeptical about whether 
constituency statutes actually help employees very much,164 
particularly because of the lack of an enforcement mechanism,165 
others have pointed out that, without the threat of hostile 
takeovers, directors lack incentives to relentlessly pursue 
shareholder interests.166 During the takeover wave of the 1980s, 
unions were instrumental in blocking several hostile takeovers, 
and they typically were part of coalitions, which induced many 
states, to introduce antitakeover statutes.167 A certain degree of 
insulation from shareholder influence is likely beneficial to other 
employees.168 While the interests of directors and employees are 
clearly not uniformly aligned, they are certainly allies with regard 
to some issues. 
The overall efficiency of hostile takeovers is of course 
controversial. Surely, not each takeover will be beneficial from a 
shareholder-value perspective, as some may indeed be driven 
more by CEO megalomania more than by anything else.169 But, 
by and large, takeovers are likely to exert a disciplining force on 
managers and reduce agency cost. However, they may also help 
to drive them into a shareholder-value frenzy that impedes long-
term bonding with stakeholders, thus increasing holdup cost. 
Irrespective of what one thinks about the efficiency implications, 
it is clear that this trade-off involves a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and employees. 
 
164. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1012 (1992) (pointing out that directors lobbying for constituency 
statutes equally lobby against plant closing and worker protection laws); Gary von 
Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 489 (1994) (challenging the efficacy of constituency statutes). See 
generally William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 
418, 420–24 (1990) (highlighting the problems that result from considering the interests 
of other constituencies). 
165. See Coates, supra note 155, at 855; Springer, supra note 155, at 108, 121. As 
noted earlier, most statutes only allow directors to take stakeholder interests into 
account, but do not require them to do so. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
166. See, e.g., Springer, supra note 135, at 122. 
167. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 111, 120–22 (1987). 
168. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1244–53 (2004) (modeling the implications of takeovers 
for employees). 
169. See, e.g., Gary Hamel, When Dinosaurs Mate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2004, at A12 
(suggesting that large mergers often destroy shareholder wealth). 
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3. The EU Takeover Directive 
The EU Takeover Directive was passed in 2004,170 following 
the recommendation of the High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts.171 At first glance, it seems to implement a system of 
board neutrality and free choice of shareholders modeled on the 
British system. According to article 9(2), the board of the target 
firm must, between the time when the board learns about the bid 
and the time when the result of the bid is made public or lapses, 
obtain authorization from shareholders before taking any action 
that might frustrate the bid other than seeking alternative bids.172 
Article 11 also sets forth the “breakthrough” rule. Under article 
11(2), restrictions on the transfer of securities (either as set out 
in the firm’s charter or by contractual stipulation) do not apply 
vis-à-vis the bidder.173 Similarly, restrictions on voting rights do 
not apply in shareholder meetings that are convened to decide 
on defensive measures, and multiple-voting shares (if permitted 
by the applicable national law) carry only one vote.174 Article 
11(4) provides for a permanent removal of these restrictions if 
the bidder manages to obtain seventy-five percent of the capital 
carrying voting rights.175 
While the primary stance taken by these provisions and the 
directive in general therefore appears to be shareholder primacy 
by allowing shareholders to make decisions that can affect the 
success of the bid,176 they are in fact less consequential than they 
 
170. Council Directive on Takeover Bids, No. 2004/25, 2004 O.J. L 142/12. 
Regarding the historical background and impediments to its enactment, see Joëlle 
Simon, Adoption of the European Directive on Takeover Bids; an On-Again, Off-Again Story, in 
PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 97, at 345. 
171. THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT ON A MODERN 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/
2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf. 
172. Council Directive on Takeover Bids, No. 2004/25, art. 9(2), 2004 O.J. L 
142/12, at 19. 
173. Id. art. 11(2), 2004 O.J. L 142/12, at 20. 
174. Id. art. 11(3). 
175. Id. art 11(4). Furthermore, extraordinary rights of shareholders to appoint 
directors no longer apply, and multiple-voting securities are treated as normal shares in 
the first meeting convened after the bid to appoint new board members. 
176. See, e.g., Steef M. Bartman, The EC Directive on Takeover Bids: Opting in as a 
Token of Good Corporate Governance, in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW IN ACCELERATED 
PROGRESS 1, 3 (Steef M. Bartman ed., 2006) (“[T]he eventual power of decision making 
on a takeover bid lies with the shareholders . . . .”). The “interests” of the company as a 
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appear to be at first glance. Article 12(1) stipulates that “Member 
States may reserve the right not to require companies” to apply 
the provisions outlined above—board neutrality and the 
breakthrough rule thus remain optional.177 However, member 
states are required to allow firms to voluntarily submit to the 
rules in their articles of association.178 While the neutrality rule is 
now compulsory under the law of most member states, only the 
three Baltic states have imposed the breakthrough rule on their 
firms.179 A firm might want to apply them voluntarily because of 
the reciprocity rule of article 12(3) that permits member states to 
exempt a firm that normally applies these rules when the bidder 
is a firm that does not apply them.180 Whether a firm will opt into 
these rules will most likely depend on what probabilities the 
decision-makers assign to being the bidder or the target of a 
hostile takeover. 
The issues relating to the board’s duties when confronted 
with a hostile takeover prevented the directive from passing for a 
long time, whose first draft dates back to 1989.181 With these 
important options left to member states in compromise, 
regulatory arbitrage gains are possible. The choice of law rules of 
the Takeover Directive offer split competencies between the laws 
 
whole referred to in article 3(1)(c) of the EU directive seems to be more ambivalent. See 
BEATE SJÅFJELL, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 346–51 (2009); 
Theo Raaijmakers, Takeover Regulation in Europe and America: The Need for Functional 
Convergence, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 205, 
210–11 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2003) (suggesting that the directive includes 
“stakeholder” elements). 
177. Council Directive on Takeover Bids, No. 2004/25, art. 9(2), 2004 O.J. L 
142/12., at 19. 
178. Id. art 12(2), 2004 O.J. L 142/12, at 21. 
179. Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Implementation of 
the Directive on Takeover Bids 6–8, 12, SEC (2007) 268 (Feb. 21, 2007) [hereinafter 
Commission Report on the Takeover Directive]. 
180. Council Directive on Takeover Bids, No. 2004/25, art. 12(3), 2004 O.J. L 
142/12, at 21. For an analysis, see Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers, in REFORMING 
COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 647 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004). 
181. See Vanessa Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids—Not Worth the Paper It’s 
Written On?, 1 EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 416, 417–31 (2004); Luca Enriques, EC 
Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
1, 24 (2006); Jette Steen Knudsen, Is the Single European Market an Illusion? Obstacles to 
Reform of EU Takeover Regulation, 11 EUR. L.J. 507 (2005); Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s 
Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political and 
Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171, 203–05 (2006). 
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of the involved member states.182 However, rules that are typically 
classified as corporate law, such as those regarding the board’s 
duties, which are crucial for defending against hostile takeovers, 
are invariably tied to the firm’s registered office.183 Admittedly, 
some rules that depend on the place of listing, such as those 
relating to the consideration for a mandatory bid, may also 
influence the incidence of takeovers, but the main 
impediment—the permissibility of defensive measures—is 
determined by the applicable corporate law.184 As previously 
stated, the costs and benefits of hostile takeovers are beyond the 
scope of this Article; however, an impact on employees is 
possible, particularly in firms with dispersed ownership. 
4. Large Blockholders, “Golden Shares” and the Breakthrough 
Rule 
In contrast to the many firms with dispersed ownership in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, board neutrality 
seems of relatively little, if any, importance for takeovers in 
publicly traded firms in continental Europe, where concentrated 
ownership dominates the corporate landscape.185 For the 
disciplinary force of hostile takeovers to create incentives, the 
replacement of managers must be a likely outcome, which is 
ruled out when management is effectively controlled by a large 
blockholder. Incumbent blockholders may fear the possibility of 
other stockholders increasing their share and outpacing them, 
possibly by breaking other blockholders out of the governing 
 
182. If a company’s shares are traded on a regulated market not of the member 
state where its registered office is located, the supervisory authority of the market state is 
considered competent with regard to the firm. Council Directive on Takeover Bids, No. 
2004/25, art. 4(2)(b), 2004 O.J. L 142/12, at 16. When shares are traded on several 
markets, the markets where it was first traded is decisive. See id. art. 4(2)(c). The same 
law governs issues that can be considered capital markets law, such as the bid price and 
procedural issues relating to the offer. See id. 
183. See id. art. 4(2)(e). 
184. See Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröger, Issuer Choice in Europe, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
521, 531 (2008). 
185. Cf. Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Corporate 
Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1287 (2009) (“[T]he arrangements 
governing control contests are largely irrelevant to [controlling shareholder] 
companies[.]”). There are clearly some dispersed ownership firms in continental 
Europe, but concentrated ownership is by far the majority structure. 
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coalition. However, this type of threat will most likely only create 
an incentive to entrench the controlling position.186 
There is a current trend on the EU level to remove such 
entrenchments. This is particularly manifest in the ECJ case law 
on “golden shares.”187 In these cases, government entities 
attempted to retain control for purported public policy reasons 
after privatization, either by means of charter provisions, or by 
special laws attaching a veto right to the owner of a specific 
share.188 While the various governments did not claim to be 
concerned with employee welfare in their defense of these 
measures before the court, golden shares may have indirectly 
benefited employees by deterring takeovers.189 
While private actors are not subject to this case law,190 this 
debate elucidates important differences between takeover 
defenses under dispersed and concentrated ownership. The 
primary concern in the United States is to entrench the board, as 
 
186. One is tempted to speculate that the relative unimportance of the neutrality 
rule explains why it was nearly universally adopted in Europe after the passing of the 
Takeover Directive, while the breakthrough rule has only been made mandatory by the 
three Baltic states. See Commission Report on the Takeover Directive, supra note 179. 
187. See Federconsumatori v. Comune di Milano, Joined Cases C-463 & 464/04, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-10419; Commission v. Netherlands, Joined Cases C-282 & 283/04, 
[2006] E.C.R. I-9141; Commission v. Italy, Case C-174/04, [2005] E.C.R. 4933; Comm’n 
v. United Kingdom, Case C-98/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-4641; Commission v. Spain, Case C-
463/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-4581; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-503/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-
4809; Commission v. France, Case C-483/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-4781; Commission v. 
Portugal, Case C-367/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-4731. For an overview of all but the three most 
recent cases, see Anne Looijestijn-Claerie, All That Glitters is Not Gold: European Court of 
Justice Strikes Down Golden Shares in Two Dutch Companies, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 429, 
431–32 (2007). The Volkswagen case, described above, see supra note 97, which triggered 
a dispute about employee participation rights, is closely related to this line of cases. 
188. More precisely, the execution of certain important decisions required the 
approval of that shareholder. 
189. Some member states, however, have not yet been deterred from enacting such 
regulation by the ECJ. On October 8, 2007, Hungary passed the “Lex MOL” to prevent 
partly government-owned Austrian OMV AG from taking control of the Hungarian 
national champion in the oil industry, MOL. See, e.g., Economic Intelligence Unit, 
Hungary Regulations: The Controversial “Lex Mol”, EIU VIEWSWIRE HUNGARY, Nov. 12, 
2007. OMV’s bid for MOL ultimately failed for antitrust reasons. See Haig Simonian, 
Brussels Blamed as OMV Ends Mol Chase, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 6, 2008, at 17. 
190. See Looijestijn-Claerie, supra note 187, at 442–45. Notably, however, the 
prohibition against golden shares applies when the state acts as a private market 
participant, for instance by introducing golden shares in the articles of association. See 
id. 
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is apparent in the use of devices such as the poison pill.191 In 
continental Europe, however, the main issue concerns 
blockholders preventing other large shareholder from collecting 
a bigger share of the firm’s votes, as is apparent though the use 
of devices such as voting caps, dual-class share structures, or 
multiple-voting shares.192 U.S.-style poison pills would hardly be 
helpful for this purpose. The duties of the board in hostile 
takeovers are of much smaller importance in corporate 
governance systems with concentrated ownership than they are 
in the United States or the United Kingdom, since large 
shareholders are more often able to mold the outcome of a bid. 
Frequently, a bidder is forced to negotiate a deal with a number 
of large shareholders. The breakthrough rule might be more 
interesting for regulatory arbitrage in the continental context. 
Consequently, regulatory arbitrage opportunities with 
respect to takeovers are unlikely to have significant effects on 
employees in firms with concentrated ownership, as incumbent 
and employee interests will normally coincide with respect to the 
firm’s contestability.193 Moreover, incumbent controlling 
shareholders will normally not have to avail themselves of 
corporate law arbitrage opportunities. They can either opt into 
provisions that make the firm more contestable or they can opt 
out of these provisions (where they are mandatory) by forming 
pyramid structures.194 
D. Shareholder Involvement Versus Independence of the Board 
The discussion of antitakeover measures illustrates the 
broader issue regarding how corporate governance matters to 
employees. Different corporate laws vary remarkably in the 
extent to which they give shareholders (as a group) power to 
 
191. John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU 
Corporation Law Be?, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 678, 698–
702 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the ways in which U.S. companies can 
avoid takeovers). 
192. Cf. Komo & Villiers, supra note 14, at 202 (pointing out that the effect of the 
Volkswagen decision was to entrench Porsche as a large blockholder). 
193. The case of Italy, which originally implemented both rules but reverted that 
decision in 2008 shows that the lobbying power of incumbents is at least sometimes 
strong enough to shield firms against takeovers on the political level. See Rock et al., 
supra note 124, at 272. 
194. Coates IV, supra note 191, at 689–90 (discussing cross-holding and pyramid 
structures that allow companies going public to shield themselves from takeovers). 
  
2010] TILTING THE BALANCE? 831 
influence business decisions taken by directors and senior 
managers. 
If the firm’s senior managers were completely insulated 
from shareholder involvement and not held accountable at all, it 
is clear that they would have no reason to favor shareholder 
interests over those of any other group. Sometimes their intrinsic 
interests will correspond to those of shareholders, and sometimes 
they will be more aligned with those of employees. Adherents of 
the “team production” theory of corporate law go further and 
posit that the relatively unconstrained position of the board of 
directors allows its members to balance the interests of different 
corporate constituencies, which in turn encourages firm-specific 
investment by stakeholder groups such as employees.195 
Obviously, releasing managers from any accountability to 
shareholders is likely to increase agency cost, as they will 
primarily attempt to use the firm for their own personal ends. 
Thus, constraining them may not only benefit shareholders, but 
also other nonshareholder constituencies.196 However, it is 
important to distinguish self-interested behavior from what could 
be called legitimate business judgment, which roughly traces the 
boundaries between the common law duties of loyalty and 
care.197 While courts typically apply a stringent standard to 
situations where directors, managers, and controlling 
shareholders misappropriate corporate assets or opportunities to 
their own personal benefit,198 judicial review of nonconflicted 
 
195. See Blair & Stout, supra note 16, 288–89 (1999) (“[P]ublic corporation law 
encourages directors to serve the joint interests of all stakeholders who comprise the 
corporate ‘team’ by generally insulating them from the demands of any single 
stakeholder group, including the shareholders.”); see also Bruno Frey & Margit Osterloh, 
Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J. MGMT. INQ. 96, 99–102 (2005) 
(advocating that a common pool approach, which incorporates the “team production” 
theory, encourages a more conscientious management); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of 
Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 136–43 (2009) (arguing that a 
comparatively greater insulation of managers from shareholder influence may result in 
more firm-specific investment in human capital by employees). 
196. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 731. 
197. Regarding U.S. law, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123–25, 142–50 
(1986), and WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, 
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 239 (3d ed. 2009). 
198. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role 
of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 427 (2001) (“[C]ourts tend to hold 
directors liable only in egregious situations involving a significant pecuniary benefit to 
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managerial decision-making provides a very loose constraint, if 
any, in most jurisdictions.199 Decisions that redistribute wealth 
between shareholders and employees typically fall into the latter 
group.200 
For the debate about the effects of regulatory arbitrage on 
employees, it is important to emphasize the distinction between 
these two different aspects of corporate governance. 
Shareholders and employees have a joint interest in impeding 
managerial self-dealing: shareholders because their financial 
claims are diluted, and employees because their jobs are less 
secure and their advancement opportunities are eliminated. 
While regulatory competition is likely to have effects on such 
issues,201 they are not the ones of primary relevance for this 
Article. 
 
the director or loss to the firm, and in which the offending director or directors failed to 
subject the self-dealing transaction to an informed vote . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
199. The U.S. business judgment rule protects directors from judicial review unless 
they fail to gather relevant information before acting, act in good faith, and stay clear of 
self-interest. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (1992). Regarding 
the United Kingdom, see DAVIES, supra note 141, at 493–94, and Brian Cheffins & 
Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1401 
(2006) (pointing out that judges are unlikely to second-guess business decisions even in 
the absence of a formal business judgment rule). Regarding France, see YVES GUYON, 1 
DROIT DES AFFAIRES [BUSINESS LAW] 502–03 (12th ed. 2001) (Fr.). Regarding Italy, see 
Giuseppe Campana, La responsabilità civile degli amministratori delle società di capitali [Civil 
Liability of Directors of Corporations], 2 LA NUOVA GIURISPRUDENZA CIVILE COMMENTATA 
215, 224–226 (2000) (discussing Italian equivalents to the business judgment rule), and 
Antonio Rossi, Art. 2392 (Responsabilità verso la società) [Art. 2392 (Liability to the 
Corporation)], in IL NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETÀ 790, 796–803 (Alberto Maffei Alberti 
ed., 2005). German law even adopted a provision modeled on the U.S. business 
judgment rule in 2005, AktG, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, § 93, last amended Gesetz 
zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG) [Act 
Regarding Business Integrity and the Modernization of Nullification Suits], Sept. 22, 
2005, BGBl I, at 2802, but only after broad managerial latitude was already recognized in 
the case law. See BGH April 21, 1997, 135 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 244 (F.R.G.), translated in GEVURTZ, supra note 151, at 80; see also 
Erich Schanze, Directors’ Duties in Germany, 3 CO. FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 286, 291 
(1999). 
200. See Blair & Stout, supra note 198, at 428 (listing board decisions that can be 
classified as business judgments as including its ability to “unilaterally raise retirees’ 
pension benefits, refuse to adopt a corporate strategy that would increase profits but 
harm the local community, and fend off a hostile takeover bid at a premium”); Gelter, 
supra note 195, at 146–47 (discussing the broad discretion provided to managers under 
the business judgment rule). 
201. See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 7, at 273–75. 
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By contrast, employees share an interest with managers 
regarding issues that do not involve what could be described as 
theft or conflicted decision-making, but simply fundamental 
business decisions. For example, it is crucial for them whether 
managers threaten to close a plant, to reduce the workforce, or 
just drive a hard bargain in collective negotiations with unions. 
Tautologically, shareholders have a financial interest in 
shareholder value maximization, which may require such actions. 
As long as managers’ decisions are not dictated by a controlling 
shareholder or forced by pro-shareholder incentives set by 
executive compensation or the market for corporate control, this 
principle does not necessarily apply to them with equal force. 
Behavioral theory suggests that managers, unless they are tightly 
constrained, do not try to maximize profits, but instead engage in 
the practice of “profit-satisficing” by determining what payoff 
would be acceptable for providers of equity.202 Profits, however, 
may be hard to verify by outside shareholders.203 Econometric 
research suggests that that managers prefer a “quiet life” and 
would rather avoid closing down plants204 instead of eagerly 
engaging in firm reorganizations that are usually associated with 
job cuts and angry unions. The U.S. debate on hostile takeovers 
 
202. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 29–30 (6th ed. 2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders 
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1986) 
(“‘[B]ehaviroal’ theory of the firm postulates that managers do not profit-maximize, but 
rather ‘profit-satsfice’—that is, they seek that level of profits that will suffice to prevent 
external interventions by dissatisfied creditors or stockholders.”); Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 804 (2005) 
(describing profit-satisficing as achieving “the level of profits necessary to avoid 
interference with [managerial] discretion but otherwise run the firm to advance other 
aims); Christoph Engel, The Behavior of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical Literature 
3 (2008) (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Paper No. 2008/23) 
(“Empirical work has shown early on that firms are often satisficers, not utility 
maximisers.”), available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2008_23online.pdf. The 
theory of “satisficing” can be traced to Simon, supra note 21. See also Julius Margolis, The 
Analysis of the Firm: Rationalism, Conventionalism, and Behavioralism, 31 J. BUS. 187, 190 
(1958) (arguing that, the objective of the firm is to achieving “satisfactory” profits, 
rather than profit maximize, due to imperfect knowledge). 
203. See, e.g., M. Pagano & P.F. Volpin, Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control, 40 
J. FIN. 841, 842 (2005). 
204. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullianathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1066–67 (2003). 
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suggests that employees and top management are often natural 
allies.205 
Besides takeover law, the other issue of corporate law that 
matters for shareholder-employee conflicts in managerial 
business decisions is the degree to which management is shielded 
from shareholder involvement.206 The team production theory of 
U.S. corporate law claims that nonshareholder constituencies 
benefit to some degree from the U.S. corporate and securities 
law that tie shareholders’ hands.207 Given the absence of 
influence by shareholders, the primary beneficiary of potential 
opportunism against employees, the latter may have better 
incentives to make specific investment.208 The theory implicitly 
rests on the variable of dispersed ownership that itself impedes 
direct shareholder involvement in managerial decision. While 
this theory seems to be a good fit for an important subset of U.S. 
publicly traded firms, it is hardly compatible with the corporate 
governance structures of firms in continental Europe, where 
large shareholders continue to exert considerable control over 
management even in firms comparable in size to their largest 
U.S. counterparts,209 unless they find some way of committing not 
 
205. See, e.g., Pagano & Volpin, supra note 203, at 864 (“[M]anagers and workers 
are natural allies against a takeover threat.”); see also Romano, supra note 167, at 120–22 
(explaining that managers natural align themselves with corporate groups outside the 
shareholder nexus when making certain decisions); Jordi Surroca & Josep A. Tribó, 
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance, 36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 748 
(2008) (positing that shareholders and stakeholders are “natural allies”). 
206. As mentioned in Part II.A, there are other aspects of the law that matter, such 
as employment protection laws and the requirement to consult with works councils, but 
these are not part of the body of pure “corporate law” and therefore not subject to the 
type of regulatory arbitrage studied here. 
207. See Blair & Stout, supra note 16, at 253 (noting that the team production 
model suggests that the legal requirement of board supervision may have evolved to 
encourage firm-specific investment by “all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ 
including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, 
such as creditors”). 
208. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 153, at 40. 
209. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 26, at 49–56; Marco Becht & Alisa Röell, Blockholdings 
in Europe: An International Comparison, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1049 (1999) (conducting an 
empirical study that finds that the degree of concentration of shareholder voting power 
is considerably higher in continental Europe than in the United States or the United 
Kingdom); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European 
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002) (finding that 44.29% of the companies in a 
study comprising 5232 companies from Western European are family controlled); Rafael 
La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 44 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (generally 
discussing the control structure of corporations in twenty-seven wealthy economies); see 
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to “expropriate” stakeholders.210 The theory’s applicability to 
firms with dispersed ownership can, however, be undermined 
setting when managers have a strong incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth. This seems to be the case in the United 
Kingdom to a larger degree than in the United States primarily 
because of U.K. takeover law.211 
For purposes of this Article, it suffices to emphasize the 
possible benefits from insulated management for employees. In 
the case of an upcoming decision clearly within the scope of 
legitimate managerial business judgment, for instance whether to 
open a new plant, a controlling shareholder or a coalition of 
blockholders will typically be in the position to influence 
management to favor the collective financial interest of 
shareholders. Corporate law rules determining the powers and 
independence of the board of directors from shareholders 
influence the degree of managerial insulation, and thus, at least 
marginally, also the position of employees. 
In fact, some European laws were purposefully designed to 
insulate managers from shareholders. Germany provides a useful 
example. Ever since the 1937 reform of German corporate law, 
the management board is appointed and dismissed by the 
supervisory board, and cause is required to revoke the 
management board members’ appointment prematurely.212 
Supervisory board members can only be dismissed prematurely 
by a supermajority of three quarters in the shareholder 
meeting.213 Shareholders can legally only involve themselves in 
management decisions when a decision is submitted for a vote by 
 
also Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Corporate Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2006) (summarizing the empirical 
evidence). But see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United 
States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377 (2009) (arguing that, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom and most other empirical evidence, dispersed ownership is not more prevalent 
in the United States than elsewhere). 
210. See Gelter, supra note 195 , at 154–76. 
211. For a comparison of the two regimes, see Armour & Skeel, supra note 163, at 
1738. For a discussion in the light of the theory outlined here, see Gelter, supra note 
195, at 188–89. 
212. AktG, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, last amended by Gesetz, July 31, 2009, 
BGBl. I at 2509, § 84(3). However, a shareholder vote of no confidence that is not 
obviously frivolous may constitute cause. With the exception of the United States, 
multiyear appointments are both permitted by the law and common. 
213. Id. § 103(1). 
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management214 The prevailing Nazi ideology of the Führerprinzip 
certainly dictated strong leadership,215 but the policy of 
insulation was at least in part the consequence of a longstanding 
debate in German economic and legal theory during the 
previous decades, in which a left-wing current in the literature 
sought to restrain the influence of capital and, arguably, to 
protect firms from changing majorities and coalitions in the 
shareholder meeting.216 
The German model affected other countries as well, such as 
Austria and France. In Austria, the German model was clearly 
followed when the Aktiengesetz was introduced in 1938.217 In 
France, the position of the Président Directeur-General (“PDG”), 
which combined the functions of the president of the board and 
the CEO, was introduced in the hastily enacted reforms of 
1940218 and 1943219 and remained mandatory until 2001.220 
 
214. Id. § 119(2). The law of course requires shareholder votes for structural 
changes such as mergers, which go beyond mere management decisions, and the courts 
have additionally required shareholder votes in the case of certain other transactions of 
high significance. BGH, Feb. 25, 1982, 174 BGHZ 80 (requiring a vote on the 
contribution of 80% of the firm’s assets to a wholly-owned subsidiary in a case popularly 
known as Holzmüller). But see BGH April 26, 2004, 155 BGHZ 02 (clarifying that 
Holzmüller duties only apply in exceptional cases). For a description of the development 
of the case law see, Marc Löbbe, Corporate Groups: Competences of the Shareholders’ Meeting 
and Minority Protection—The German Federal Court of Justice’ Recent Gelatine and Macotron 
Cases Redefine the Holzmüller Doctrine, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1057 (2004). 
215. See Jan von Hein, Vom Vorstandvorsitzenden zum CEO? [From Chief Executive 
Officer to CEO?], 166 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 
464, 475 (2002). 
216. Important writers include: WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN: EINE 
GESCHÄFTLICHE BETRACHTUNG (1917); and Oskar Netter, Zur aktienrechtlichen Theorie des 
„Unternehmens an sich”, in FESTSCHRIFT HERRN RECHTSANWALT UND NOTAR JUSTIZRAT 
DR.JUR.H.C. ALBERT PINNER ZU SEINEM 75 GEBURTSTAG 507 (Deutscher Anwaltsverein et 
al., eds., 1932). But see FRITZ HAUSSMANN, VOM AKTIENWESEN UND VOM AKTIENRECHT 
(1928) (criticizing Rathenau’s theory of the institutional interest of the corporation). 
217. The 1938 promulgation of Aktiengesetz was introduced for newly founded 
corporations on April 11, 1938 by Erste Verordnung zur Einführung handelsrechtlicher 
Vorschriften im Lande Österreich [First Regulation to Introduce Commercial Law 
Provisions in the Land of Austria], RGBl No. 385/1938, and for existing firms as of 
January 1, 1939, by Zweite Verordnung zur Einführung handelsrechtlicher Vorschriften 
im Lande Österreich [Second Regulation to Introduce Commercial Law Provisions in 
the Land of Austria] RGBl No. 982/1938. 
218. Law of Nov. 16, 1940, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 1940, p. 5828. This law replaced the prior Law of 
September 18, 1940, before it could come into force. See Paul Cordonnier, Loi du 16 
novembre 1940, in 1941 DALLOZ RECUEIL CRITIQUE 1, 1–2 (1941). 
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Contemporary writers sometimes attributed this development to 
a “transposition of the German theory of the Führerprinzip” in 
France (although the issue is, unsurprisingly, controversial).221 
French law, however, always retained the rule that directors could 
be removed by a shareholder resolution at any time, which 
counteracted the independence of the PDG.222 Even the United 
Kingdom, which is usually thought of as the most pro-
shareholder European jurisdiction, once had a statute requiring 
directors to have regard to the interests of employees.223 The 
Companies Act of 2006 has, however, changed the law to the 
effect of requiring a concern to “enlightened shareholder 
value.”224 
Concentrated ownership structures persisted in spite of 
these rules, and large shareholders usually remain able to impose 
their will on corporations, even in Germany.225 However, the 
extent to which directors and managers are able to assert their 
independence from large shareholders depends on a complex 
set of factors, including personal authority and corporate culture. 
But in the case of any individual firm, the applicable law is still a 
major determinant of shareholder influence of major and minor 
 
219. Law of Mar. 4, 1943, J.O., Mar. 6, 1943, p. 642 (Fr.); see also MICHEL GERMAIN 
& LOUIS VOGEL, 1:2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 400, 442–45 (G. Ripert & R. Roblot 
eds., 18th ed. 2001). 
220. Law No. 2001-420 of Mar. 15, 2001, J.O., May 16, 2001, p. 7776 (Fr.). 
221. See, e.g., JEAN PAILLUSSEAU, LA SOCIETE ANONYME, TECHNIQUE 
D’ORGANISATION DE L’ENTREPRISE 154–55 (1967) (Fr.) (providing various references). 
222. See GERMAIN & VOGEL, supra note 219, at 453; Claude Ducouloux-Favard, Les 
déviances de la gestion dans nos grandes entreprises [The Deviations of Management in Our 
Largest Businesses], 1996 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, chronique 190, 191 (describing the 
possibility of removal at nutum as being at odds with the prevailing institutional theory of 
the firm); Enriques et al., supra note 36, at 61 (noting the nonwaivable right in French 
law to remove directors midterm). 
223. See supra notes 142–43. 
224. See supra note 141. 
225. Supervisory board members, who decide about the removal of management 
board members, are typically close confidants of large shareholders, and the 
requirement of a 75% supermajority is not insurmountable. See, e.g., Peter Doralt, Die 
Unabhängigkeit des Vorstands nach österreichischem und deutschen Aktienrecht—Schein und 
Wirklichkeit [The Independence of the Board Under Austrian and German Company Law—
Appearance and Reality], in DIE GESTALTUNG DER ORGANISATIONSDYNAMIK. FESTSCHRIFT 
FÜR OSKAR GRÜN 31, 47–48 (Werner H. Hoffmann ed., 2003); see also Reinhard H. 
Schmidt, Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective, in THE GERMAN 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 386, 393 (Jan Pieter Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., 2004) 
(reporting that blockholders and banks are represented on the supervisory board 
besides employees). 
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business decisions. This factor could therefore be the subject of 
regulatory arbitrage. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE IN THE 
NEXUS BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Having identified legal mechanisms that could potentially 
serve as targets for regulatory arbitrage, this Part will now analyze 
possible consequences of ex ante and ex post corporate law 
choices in corporate law. As a result of the ECJ’s Centros and 
Überseering cases, codetermination and other aspects of corporate 
law relevant to employees are no longer mandatory at the 
formation stage of the firm, at least in those member states that 
do not counteract EC law by setting up further hurdles for setting 
up a branch office.226 The only limitation is the necessity to select 
the entire bundle of a particular law. 
A. Ex Ante Choice of Law 
At the formation stage, the incorporation decision is often 
taken by a group of founders who will typically take on the role of 
shareholders and managers concurrently; minority investors, 
employees, and other stakeholders only enter the picture later. 
In other cases, employee participation systems may already be 
important at the beginning, for example when a joint subsidiary 
comprising some existing business is set up by two firms from 
different countries. Obviously, regulatory arbitrage can have a 
beneficial impact: founders will be able to choose the bundle 
most appropriate in light of the firm’s business environment. 
This applies also to the firm’s relationship with its employees:227 
If the mechanisms described in the previous section indeed 
protect employees’ specific investment, firms operating in an 
industry where specific investment is a competitive advantage will 
 
226. See Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 
Case C-208/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919; Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case 
C-212/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459. But see Becht et al., supra note 12 (describing differences 
in costs among member states and even citing blatant disregard of ECJ case law in 
some). 
227. Cf. Stefano Lombardo, Conflict of Law Rules in Company Law after Überseering: 
An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Allocation of Policy Competence in the European 
Union, 4 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 301, 322–30 (2003) (making a similar argument 
regarding creditors). 
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be able to choose the preferable legal system by committing to a 
beneficial legal framework in the formation stage. Firms 
choosing a suboptimal regime would—in the long run—be 
eliminated by competition in product markets. The result would 
be, more or less, efficient choice.228 
In practice, however, pro-employee laws, particularly 
employee participation systems, appear not to be selected 
voluntarily on a regular basis. To the contrary, it currently seems 
that some firms are trying to escape or mitigate German 
codetermination through regulatory arbitrage.229 Of course, one 
reason could be that these are simply inefficient and therefore 
not chosen by firms.230 However, there are other possibilities. The 
primary corporate law issue driving regulatory arbitrage at the 
formation stage seems to be minimum capital and related 
creditor protection doctrines, which have also been the only issue 
addressed by legislative reactions to corporate law arbitrage. At 
the founding stage, employee participation systems are hardly 
any concern, since it is not known whether they will ever grow big 
enough to support a substantial workforce. With employee 
participation systems typically “bundled” with minimum capital 
in one regulatory package, they simply are not important enough 
to influence the incorporation decision. 
Even a choice influenced by long-term prospects of the firm 
may not be uniformly efficient. The most frequently cited 
arguments in the literature regarding why such regimes are not 
chosen voluntarily appears to be adverse selection: laws 
increasing the bargaining position may reduce the wage 
differential between senior management and workers, which is 
why the best managers might avoid these firms; furthermore, 
since the least able workers are likely to have the strongest 
preference for job security, firms committing to consider 
employee interests may also attract the least effective workers.231 
 
228. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production 
Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 472–
75 (1979) (arguing that the burden of proof lies with the proponents of 
codetermination). 
229. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
230. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 228, at 472–75. 
231. See Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 17, at 679. For similar arguments regarding the 
voluntary introduction of provisions equivalent to employment protection laws, see 
Armour & Deakin, supra note 17, at 447–48; David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment 
Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 293 (1991); and Cass R. 
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Furthermore, for individual employees it may be irrational to 
bargain for job protection as it may signal the absence of a 
commitment to work hard.232 
The analysis so far has assumed that employees are able to 
look after their own interests by penalizing an unfavorable 
corporate law regime with a discount, in a similar way as creditors 
may impose higher interest rates, or simply by avoiding specific 
investment and always expecting the looming possibility of a job 
change in the near future. In reality, this assumption may not 
always hold, with some employees being unable to adjust their 
firm-specific investment to a level commensurate with the risk. 
This mirrors the debate about corporate creditors, which 
distinguishes between “adjusting creditors” on one side, and 
“non-adjusting” or only “partially adjusting” creditors on the 
other.233 Only adjusting creditors react to risk by requiring higher 
interest rates, by stipulating that the entire loan will fall due in 
the case of events that increase risk, or simply by not trading at 
all. Analogously, non-adjusting workers might put too much trust 
in their relationship with the firm and therefore overinvest 
compared to what would be optimal from their individual 
perspective. 
While it is hard to assess whether a substantial group of such 
workers exists, regulatory arbitrage would then become largely a 
fairness issue. If workers always specifically invest, the legal 
arrangement is irrelevant for purposes of a firm’s 
competitiveness. Still, the issue can be relevant for distributive 
policy reasons. In order to maximize social welfare234 one would 
then need to have context-specific information about the 
marginal utility of wealth of workers and stockholders. 
Even when workers adjust, one likely problem for the 
voluntary provision of pro-employee rules is that crucial aspects 
 
Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 225–26 (2001). But see 
J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: 
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 902–05 (describing the adverse 
selection argument and possible objections). 
232. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 231, at 225–26; Verkerke, supra note 231, at 903. 
233. See, e.g., John Armour, Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
REV. 5, 10–11 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the 
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864–65 (1996). 
234. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
(2002) (discussing total social welfare as the maxim and of economic and legal analysis). 
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of corporate law favoring employees, such as codetermination, 
pertain to the entire firm. Such mechanisms could then not 
develop as the result of bargaining within the individual 
employment relationship. In fact, one of the major mechanisms 
protecting workers is collective bargaining, where either unions 
or elected representatives act as the agents of workers.235 
B. Ex Post Opportunism: The Clash Between Shareholder, Manager, 
and Employee Interests in Corporate Law Arbitrage 
1. Benefits and Risks of Flexibility 
Ex post choice, like ex ante choice, has important 
advantages, the most obvious being flexibility. Employee 
participation systems could be designed to operate efficiently and 
adapted to the changing needs of the firm, for instance those 
regarding the size of the supervisory board or the degree of 
employee involvement, which of course might depend on the 
industry and market of the firm. 
The downside of employee participation systems is often 
their inflexibility. German codetermination law rigidly stipulates 
a mandatory size of the board depending on the size of the 
firm236 and has thus long been criticized for making the 
supervisory board cumbersome and ineffective.237 Comparable 
provisions neither exist in some other member states with 
codetermination systems, nor for SEs or firms that undergo a 
cross-border merger.238 Firms might therefore avail themselves of 
a less intrusive system where these disadvantages are less serious. 
The downside of flexibility is always the risk of not meeting 
someone’s expectations. In this case, employees might form 
expectations about the stability of the work environment. If a 
 
235. Cf. Armour & Deakin, supra note 17, at 445 (suggesting that specific collective 
rights of employees may protect firm-specific human capital). 
236. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
237. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 26, at 73; Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A 
Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 163, 178–79 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
238. For analysis of these rules, see Habersack, supra note 86, at 632–34. It is 
disputed whether the total number of members must be agreed upon during 
negotiations or whether it can be set in the corporate charter (meaning that the result 
of negotiations would have to be the share of seats on the board allocated to 
employees). 
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reincorporation coupled with a reduction in participation rights 
is possible, these expectations might not be fulfilled because 
employees’ formal or informal power has been reduced. As a 
result, the possibility of reincorporation could therefore 
marginally influence the incidence of specific investment. 
2. Reasons for Mandatory Corporate Law and the Importance 
of Ownership Structure 
Ex post opportunism is often brought as a rationale why 
corporate law should be mandatory. In the United States, Lucian 
Bebchuk argues that management is able to accomplish charter 
amendments that are detrimental to shareholders and 
advantageous to management, given the powerful position of the 
board in U.S. firms and collective action problems of 
shareholders.239 Correspondingly, amendments that are 
beneficial to shareholders, but detrimental to managers, will not 
happen. Mandatory constraints might therefore be beneficial.240 
As a first step, it is necessary to ask who decides about 
reincorporations in practice, since this power ultimately 
determines the ability to use arbitrage opportunities. Employees 
as a driving force can be ruled out, given that they cannot induce 
firms to reincorporate.241 While it is clear that the initial 
incorporation decision is taken by the founders of the firm, the 
question becomes more complicated when the company is up 
and running, and when different interest groups and coalitions 
have formed. If regulatory arbitrage is driven by shareholder 
interest, employees may suffer from shareholder opportunism. 
However, the situation is more complicated because managers 
may also play a role. Given the triangle of possible coalitions, 
regulatory competition might lead to different results depending 
on which coalition’s form is able to prevail. 
As previously noted, a variable that fundamentally alters the 
equation in the theory of regulatory competition is the presence 
of controlling shareholders in continental Europe and the 
 
239. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Limits of Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1835–47 
(1989). 
240. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1549, 1573–85 (1989). 
241. See Dammann, supra note 4, 515–16. 
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tendency to see dispersed ownership in U.S. firms.242 In the U.S. 
context, Lucian Bebchuk has pointed out that it is necessary to 
have both the board of directors and the majority of 
shareholders agree to a reincorporation.243 Thus, 
reincorporations typically will not purely favor either managers 
or shareholders, but there must be something in it for both 
groups for a firm to subject itself to the law of a new state. In 
spite of possible pressures from the capital markets to 
incorporate in a state with “optimal” corporate law, agency 
problems will never be fully resolved because of the board veto.244 
At the same time, regulatory competition will also not be fully 
pro-managerial because of the necessity of a shareholder vote.245 
In the United States, the requirement to submit a 
reincorporation proposal to a shareholder vote provides at least 
some degree of a check on managerial opportunism in deciding 
on reincorporations according to Bebchuk’s modern “race to the 
bottom” school of thought.246 
However, concentrated ownership implies that the relevant 
agency problem is not the one between managers and 
shareholders, but between majority and minority shareholders. 
Majority shareholders will typically decide on the issue of 
reincorporation alone, which may allow them to capture the 
regulatory competition process, or at least to use regulatory 
arbitrage possibilities.247 As described in another article, large 
shareholders effectively control reincorporation in continental 
Europe.248 Unlike managers in the United States, who need a 
shareholder vote for a reincorporation that increases agency cost, 
managers in continental Europe do not need to seek the 
approval of the minority for their actions. This argument applies 
analogously with regard to non-shareholder constituencies. It has 
already been suggested that creditors of European firms might 
find themselves in a similar situation with their expectations 
 
242. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
243. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1460–61 (1992). 
244. See id. at 1470. 
245. See id. 
246. See id. at 1471–75. In fact, Bebchuk’s view can be classified as intermediate 
because he seeks to identify criteria for which a race to the top or bottom is likely. 
247. See Gelter, supra note 7, at 269–75. For a similar analysis see also Birkmose, 
supra note 7, at 47–54. 
248. See Gelter, supra note 7, at 269–75. 
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being negatively affected, because shareholders, particularly 
large blockholders, control the incorporation process.249 
Equivalently, if reincorporation is ex post beneficial to 
shareholders, but harmful to employees, it is very likely that such 
a redistributive reincorporation will take place when shareholder 
benefits exceed the (possibly substantial) costs of 
reincorporation. In the case of a true shareholder-stakeholder 
conflict, large blockholders will even be able to typically obtain 
the support of minority shareholders. 
Thus, ownership structure plays an important role. However, 
in individual cases it will depend on what coalitions are formed. 
For example, in a dispersed ownership company, employees and 
shareholders might share an interest in strong enforcement of 
the directors’ duty of loyalty, while they would probably share 
managers’ interests regarding hostile takeovers and the prospect 
of confrontation with the board. In other words, with respect to 
issues where managers and employees share similar objectives, 
employees might gain by free-riding on managerial opportunism 
because managers succeed in committing the firm to a legal 
system not hospitable to takeovers and resisting shareholders’ 
attempts to change the applicable regime. In a concentrated 
ownership environment, however, managers are immediately 
subject to the wishes of the controlling shareholder and will be 
unable to resist their advances. 
True, ex ante there may be an incentive to commit to a 
corporate law system favorable to employees in order to ensure 
their goodwill and long-term cooperation. However, an ex ante 
decision is only helpful if it is coupled with a previous 
commitment. Shareholders may sometimes benefit from an ex 
post change of the applicable regime to the detriment of 
employees, in which case there will be little incentive for 
shareholders or managers to take the interests of nonshareholder 
constituencies into account in ex post reincorporation 
decisions.250 If a reincorporation is easy, any ex ante choice is 
simply preliminary, which is why it cannot have any desirable 
incentive effects. 
 
249. Enriques & Gelter, supra note 8, at 617–18. 
250. Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 243, at 1485. 
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3. Dispersed Ownership and Employees 
Next, consider firms with dispersed ownership, which 
predominate in Europe only among listed firms in the United 
Kingdom. As suggested by the U.S. discussion, the objective 
sought by self-interested managers seems to be increased 
independence from shareholders.251 All three of the issues 
identified earlier as relevant for employees252 may play a role 
here—reducing direct possibilities by shareholders to influence 
managerial conduct may widen the possibilities for managers to 
obtain rents and classical private benefits of control. In other 
words, it may affect agency cost. By contrast, team production 
advocates emphasize that shielding managers from shareholders 
allows insulated managers to avoid the exploitation of the quasi-
rents of nonshareholder constituencies.253 
Part III.D of this Article describes the potential conflicts of 
interest where managers and employees will be on one side, and 
shareholders on the other. While I have argued elsewhere that 
the influence of dispersed shareholders on managerial decision-
making is greater in the United Kingdom than in the United 
States (among other things, because of a higher incidence of 
hostile takeovers),254 it does not seem likely that managers might 
use it as an opportunity to secure independence from 
shareholders. To be sure, the issues identified above might serve 
this purpose. In a dispersed ownership firm, employees on the 
board might be faithful allies of management against “intrusion” 
by shareholder activists or outside board members seeking to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Directors’ duties using a pluralist 
objective may sometimes help directors to justify their actions 
when seeking re-election, as they could say that a new 
management team would not be in the position to do anything 
else. And, of course, it might help them to construct a shield 
against the occasional liability suit. Likewise, a reduced risk of 
hostile takeovers may increase managers’ freedom to act. Here, it 
 
251. See Bebchuk, supra note 243, at 1462–68 (describing the value-decreasing rules 
that managers may seek when determining whether to reincorporate). 
252. See supra Part II.B–D. 
253. See Blair & Stout, supra note 16; see also Coffee, supra note 202, at 70–71, 73–81 
(discussing breaches of implicit agreements as a result of hostile takeovers); Shleifer & 
Summers, supra note 153, at 42 (same). 
254. Gelter, supra note 195, at 186–93. 
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is the duties of managers (or their freedom to defend against 
takeovers) that may be important also for employees. The U.S. 
experience provides a good example: firms all but threatened to 
migrate out of Delaware when it was suggested that managers 
would be forced to let hostile takeovers go through.255 
Among these three options, it is probably safe to say that 
employee participation systems are likely to be the least popular 
among managers. Even as potential allies, employee board 
representatives are difficult to keep under control and will 
typically seek to promote their own agenda.256 It is sometimes 
argued that German codetermination undermines the 
functioning of the supervisory board because employee 
representatives cannot sometimes be trusted with confidential 
information.257 While this argument is usually made before the 
backdrop of German concentrated ownership, it applies 
irrespective of ownership structure: employee participation may 
help managers when employee and managerial interests 
coincide, but it may hurt them greatly when they do not.258 In 
dispersed-ownership firms, managers will therefore rather seek a 
coalition with shareholders against employees with regard to 
codetermination. Although the European legal framework puts 
 
255. The notorious “Wachtell Lipton Memo” was disseminated by one of the 
leading U.S. corporate law firms after the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in City 
Capital Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d. 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), which would have greatly 
reduced managers ability to defend against hostile bids. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1959 n.95 (1991) (quoting 
Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz to clients, The Interco Case (Nov. 
3, 1988)). The decision was subsequently rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court. See 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d. 1140 (Del. 1990). 
256. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms, 
in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 227, 247 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (describing how labor interests 
predominate the discussion on German boards). 
257. See, e.g., Jean J. Du Plessis & Otto Sandrock, The Rise and Fall of Supervisory 
Board Codetermination in Germany, 16 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 67, 74–75 (2005); 
FitzRoy & Kraft, supra note 61, at 236 (citing studies revealing a deliberate restriction of 
information in some firms); Roe, supra note 37, at 171–75. 
258. See supra notes 198–203 (contrasting when employee and manager interests 
coincide and when they do not). An example would be managerial private benefits of 
control or self-dealing, which is typically not in line with employee interests. However, it 
may sometimes be possible to bribe employee representatives on the board, which is not 
a novel practice. The most prominent case is the Volkswagen corruption affair. See Mark 
Landler, Sentences in Volkswagen Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at C3. From the 
perspective of a potential managerial self-dealer it will be preferable if there is no 
employee representative they would have to bribe. 
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some breaks on the erosion of employee participation systems, 
codetermination arbitrage may be a factor to reckon with even in 
continental dispersed-ownership firms, whose number has 
increased during the past decade.259 
Reduced exposure to takeovers and attenuated influence of 
shareholders on the firm may be of broader interest for both 
employees and managers. One might, for example, expect 
managers to seek opportunistic movements away from member 
states that implement the neutrality rule. In fact, regulatory 
competition is usually considered to be the reason for the pro-
manager slant in U.S. takeover law.260 However, as a general 
matter, it seems relatively unlikely that shareholders in European 
firms that already have dispersed ownership would agree to a 
reincorporation into a less takeover-friendly jurisdiction, 
particularly if such a move was motivated by pro-employee 
concerns. Most of all, a shareholder vote would seem to be a 
particularly strong obstacle for British companies. True, U.S. 
shareholders have often approved staggered boards in the past, 
which is one of the elements that makes a company takeover-
proof, but this has stopped since about 1990.261 Institutional 
investors in Britain are also known to be more proactive than 
their U.S. counterparts; while normally acting cautiously, they are 
known to take action in situations where the alarm bells in a 
particular firm ring.262 A reincorporation into another member 
state from Britain, and the (partial) attempt to escape from the 
financial culture of the City of London would seem to be a more 
significant event than a mere reincorporation from one U.S. state 
to another. Arguably, the recent EU Shareholder Rights 
Directive263 will strengthen the position of institutional 
 
259. See generally Julian Franks et al., The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: A 
Comparative Study of France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. (Oct. 1, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102475. 
260. See e.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 154. 
261. Bebchuk et al., supra note 159, at 900 (describing how staggered boards were 
frequently approved before 1990, but not afterwards). 
262. See, e.g., G. P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 122–29 (1996); John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the 
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1751–
54, 1752 (2002); Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional 
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2036–37, 2053 (1994). 
263. Council Directive on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed 
Companies, No. 2007/36, 2007 O.J. L 184/17. 
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investors—often based in the United States or the United 
Kingdom—also in other member states.264 Thus, the argument 
would seem to apply by analogy also in continental dispersed 
ownership firms. 
4. Concentrated Ownership and Employees 
The more pressing issue seems to be whether firms with 
concentrated ownership might avail themselves of corporate law 
arbitrage opportunities that are relevant to employees. Here, the 
triangular relationship between shareholders, managers, and 
employees is transformed into one involving large shareholders, 
small investors, and employees. This changes the situation 
dramatically, since powerful managers are essentially eliminated 
from the picture as another independent force framing issues of 
corporate policy. Large blockholders, either acting single-
handedly or in coalition, can easily initiate a reincorporation if 
they can garner the required supermajority.265 Large 
shareholders are also in a position to exploit holdup possibilities 
with respect to employees by means of their continued control 
over management; if, for some reason, they are unwilling or 
unable to do so, they may voluntarily sell control to someone else 
who will, and thus share part of the profits arising from 
opportunistic behavior towards employees. In the issues 
identified above as potential shareholder-stakeholder conflicts, 
minority and large shareholders share an ex post interest in large 
financial gains. While I have elsewhere argued that large 
shareholders are in a position to exploit the minority by means of 
regulatory arbitrage,266 they are equally well-positioned to exploit 
holdup possibilities to the detriment of employees. 
This argument is in line with U.S. varieties of stakeholder 
theories of corporate law, particularly the team production 
 
264. See Arthur R. Pinto, The European Union’s Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from 
an American Perspective: Some Comparisons and Observations, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 587, 
617–19 (2009). 
265. Amendments to a firm’s charter in European states, including the United 
Kingdom, typically require a supermajority. See, e.g., AktG, Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I at 1089, 
§ 179(2), last amended by Gesetz, July 31, 2009, BGBl. I at 2509 (F.R.G.) (requiring a 
majority vote of three-quarters for reincorporation); C. TRAV. art. L. 225-96 (Fr.) 
(requiring two-thirds); Companies Act 2006, 2006, c.46, §§ 21(1), 283(1) (U.K.) 
(requiring three-quarters). 
266. Gelter, supra note 7, at 269–75. 
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theory,267 which emphasizes that stakeholders will benefit from 
the insulation of the board from shareholders. In the 
comparative corporate governance debate, some authors seem to 
share this position.268 Others have suggested that employees 
could rely on the long-term position of large shareholders within 
the firm, who might have a greater stake in securing the long-
term cooperation of stakeholders.269 The second view would 
seem to rule out opportunistic reincorporations to the detriment 
of labor and rather indicate that controlling shareholders might 
seek alliances with labor against small investors. The literature 
seems not yet to have made much progress towards a synthesis of 
these two opposing views, which would require a closer 
investigation of what factors determine the stance towards 
stakeholders taken by either managers or controlling 
shareholders.270 For purposes of regulatory arbitrage, it is 
important to emphasize that the effects on employees may largely 
depend on the identity of the controlling shareholder, as that 
person may refrain from opportunism for idiosyncratic reasons. 
Employees can be protected from takeovers because of 
nonpecuniary benefits received by the controller of a firm.271 
 
267. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 195, at 418–22. 
268. See, e.g., Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, Corporate Governance: 
Stakeholder Value versus Shareholder Value, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 107, 116 (2001); 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 758 
(1997); see also Michel A. Habib, Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of 
Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts, 1 EUR. FIN. REV. 139 (1997) (mathematical model in the 
LBO context); Pagano & Volpin, supra note 203, at 841 (providing a model in which 
managers have an incentive to provide employees with strong protection to make the 
firm unattractive as a target of takeovers; however, this incentive rests on managers 
having only a small stake in equity). 
269. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate 
Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: 
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 23, supra note 176, at 27; Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 
Ownership and Control in Europe, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 722, 728–29; Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The 
Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 447, 451 (2003). 
270. For an attempt to provide a formal model addressing the issue see Giulio 
Ecchia, Martin Gelter & Piero Pasotti, Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment 
Law, and the Costs of Expropriation (European Corporate Governance Institute Law 
Working Paper No. 128/2009, 2009), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=1430623. 
271. See Gilson, supra note 209, at 1663–64 (defining nonpecuniary benefits as 
“forms of psychic and other benefits that, without more, involve no transfer of real 
company resources and do not disproportionately dilute the company’s stock to a 
diversified investor”). 
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This could be, for example, the personal satisfaction that a 
member of an entrepreneurial family may derive from his or her 
privileged position as a controlling shareholder,272 or political 
benefits if the controlling shareholder is a government entity. 
Those controlling shareholders that are in a position to initiate 
reincorporations therefore have a shared interest with employees 
and are unlikely to reincorporate in an environment where their 
position is less secure. However, regulatory arbitrage could be a 
possible road to go down once the nonpecuniary benefit has 
subsided—such as when a family firm is passed on by the 
founding generation. As far as aspects of corporate law actually 
help to foster long-term commitment, regulatory arbitrage gains 
can easily obtained by the controlling shareholder once such a 
change occurs. 
Assuming constant ownership structures, are any of the 
relevant corporate law issues likely to trigger anti-employee 
arbitrage, or sufficiently significant to help support a decision to 
reincorporate? Board-centric takeover defenses are largely 
irrelevant for firms with concentrated ownership; blockholders’ 
cooperation is often needed for a change of control over the 
firm. The neutrality rule is irrelevant. The breakthrough rule 
may be significant, given that it removes some entrenchment 
possibilities of large shareholders.273 For employees, its relevance 
is limited to those where the incumbent controller (such as an 
entrepreneurial family) takes a friendly attitude towards them to 
foster long-term investment, whereas the challenger (such as a 
hedge fund), takes a different position. 
In some cases, the reciprocity rule of the Takeover Directive 
may create incentives to opt into board neutrality and the 
breakthrough rule. Since other firms normally applying these 
rules may opt out of them vis-à-vis firms that do not apply them, 
the reciprocity rule facilitates taking over firms. Firms (through 
their controlling shareholders) expecting to be bidders and not 
targets might avail themselves of this possibility, but potential 
 
272. See Mike Burkart et al., Family Firms, 58 J. FIN. 2167, 2168 (2003) (“A founder 
may derive pleasure from having his child run the company that bears the family 
name.”); cf. Gilson, supra note 209, at 1666 (describing social and political benefits that 
accompany being a member of the fifteen wealthiest families in Sweden). 
273. See Joseph A. McCahery et al., The Economics of the Proposed European Takeover 
Directive, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 575, 623–36 (Guido 
Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004). 
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targets will not. Firms are more likely to be targets if there are 
either inefficiencies, potential private benefits of control for the 
bidder,274 or rents that can be expropriated from employees.275 
Opting out of the neutrality or breakthrough rule in order 
to avoid being an open target may be a potential corporate law 
arbitrage strategy, and typically one that employees will 
appreciate. By contrast, opting into either of these rules will not 
work in their favor. However, an opt-in does not necessarily 
require corporate law arbitrage because member states must 
permit firms to do so in their charter.276 
Thus, the one major employee-relevant issue where one 
might expect significant corporate law arbitrage is employee 
participation. Controlling shareholders are not likely to be in 
favor of it, in substance for the same reason as powerful 
managers in a Berle-Means firm. While employee directors might 
sometimes turn out to be useful allies for managers,277 their 
propensity to develop their own agenda, and the frequent 
suspicion that they cannot be trusted with certain sensitive 
information relevant for their constituencies,278 will most likely 
be a deterrent against codetermination. As a result of an 
increased involvement of international institutional investors 
precipitated by developments such as the Shareholder Rights 
Directive,279 even relatively employee-friendly controlling 
shareholders might feel compelled to put greater weight on the 
concerns of small shareholders with issues that are as visible as 
employee participation.280 It seems safe to conjecture that 
corporate law arbitrage would in most cases disfavor employee 
participation. 
 
274. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 
109 Q.J. ECON. 957 (1994) (providing an analysis how various factors, including private 
benefits of control of controlling shareholders, determine what kind of takeover law is 
best suited for a particular corporate governance system). 
275. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 153, at 34. 
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Some scholars have suggested that regulatory competition 
could precipitate changes in corporate governance structures. 
Most of all, the U.K. takeover regime might draw continental 
firms seeking a stock exchange listing, ultimately aiming for 
dispersed ownership.281 In addition to the other benefits, this 
could entail an increase due to gains from employees if the firm 
becomes more contestable.282 However, making use of 
transnational regulatory possibilities may not even be necessary. 
Although member states are not required to implement the 
neutrality and breakthrough rules as mandatory law, they are 
required to allow firms to apply them voluntarily.283 Unless the 
British Takeover Panel possesses significant institutional 
advantages over its counterparts in other EU member states, a 
choice within one legal system (and simply making the respective 
choice in the charter) will suffice. Firms can still seek an 
exchange listing in the United Kingdom, in which case they will 
be subject to those aspects of U.K. takeover law that hinge on the 
exchange listing. Most other issues of takeover law, besides board 
duties, are not dependent on where the firm has its registered 
office.284 
5. Erosion of Codetermination? 
The rather theoretical reflections of the preceding sections 
aside, the one practical issue where we already seem to be seeing 
regulatory arbitrage is employee participation. Ex post changes 
of the applicable codetermination regime could be used for 
opportunistic purposes by controlling shareholders, as the assent 
of employees is not required. At first glance, the negotiation 
mechanism regarding employee participation applicable to cross-
border mergers and the creation of an SE would seem to greatly 
mitigate the effects of such a move. Even when using the less 
“employee-friendly” rules of the Directive on Cross-Border 
Mergers, the highest level of employee participation prevails 
when a third of the merged firm’s employees were previously 
subject to any participation system; and even where a single 
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employee was previously subject to such a mechanism, the SNB 
may decide which participation system applies. 
One might therefore conclude that the SNB has a strong 
bargaining position, as the default rule awards the entire prize to 
their constituency.285 Some commentators have concluded that 
codetermination effectively insulates employee participation 
systems from regulatory competition.286 If the analysis stopped 
here, the only situation where the expectations of employees in 
one member state with regard to a particular level of 
participation would be disappointed might be one where 
shareholders and managers succeed in pitting employee groups 
from different states against each other.287 Significantly, the 
default rules do not apply in newly merged entities where 
previously fewer than twenty-five percent (SE Directive) or thirty-
three percent (Cross-Border Merger Directive) of employers 
were subject to an employee participation system.288 The 
rationale for this threshold is apparently to avoid forcing 
boardroom participation on reluctant employees.289 
However, the impression that codetermination is completely 
protected is deceptive. An SE can indeed be used to escape 
codetermination by converting into a legal form of national 
law.290 A conversion into a corporation governed by national law 
is permitted two years after the registration of the SE, and after 
that period, it will not normally be considered “misuse.”291 As 
already pointed out, a merger with a legal form of national law 
may even be possible before the end of the two-year period.292 
Whether an employee participation system must be “transferred” 
to the acquiring firm is essentially up to the member state. 
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Likewise, after a period of least three years (unless member state 
law prescribes a longer period), a firm formed by a cross-border 
merger can be merged with a “clean slate” firm that is not subject 
to a negotiated employee participation agreement.293 In both 
cases, it is largely left to the member state where the firm is 
incorporated to decide how the negotiated employee 
participation system is dealt with in such cases. True, some 
companies may be deterred from setting up an SE or merging by 
the lengthy negotiation process.294 However, companies may 
elect to submit to the applicable default participation rules 
voluntarily in a cross-border merger and thus avoid lengthy 
negotiations.295 Whether “outreach statutes” applying national 
employee participation systems to “pseudo-foreign” firms 
incorporated in other member states will be politically feasible 
and legally possible under EU law remains to be seen.296 
While transformations into the SE form have so far not yet 
become a mass phenomenon, they are growing in popularity. In 
June 2008, there were 213 SEs in Europe.297 So far there is no 
systematic data on the exact motivation to transform a firm into 
an SE, but anecdotal evidence indicates that board structure 
plays an important role. While some observers point out that the 
legally mandated size of the German supervisory board is often 
considered detrimental by firms,298 at least in some cases, SEs 
appear to have been used to avoid the future possibility of 
codetermination or of a stronger form of it once the firm 
exceeds the required size threshold.299 Some observers predict 
that a large proportion of large publicly traded German firms 
may become SEs in the future.300 Given that only a handful of the 
 
293. See supra note 124. 
294. See Joseph McCahery & Erik Vermeulen, Does the European Company Prevent the 
‘Delaware Effect’?, 11 EUR. L.J. 785, 799 (2005); Rock et al., supra note 124, at 218. 
295. See supra notes 82–83. 
296. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
297. Eidenmüller et al., supra note 68, at 20. 
298. See id. at 25 (reporting that several German publicly traded firms reduced the 
number of board members). 
299. See Ingrid Herden & Reinhard Kowalewsky, Das neue Drohpotenzial: Europa-AG 
[The New Potential Threat: Europe-AG], CAPITAL, Mar. 19, 2008, at 192 (citing a 
representative of Klöckner SE saying that there will never be board codetermination 
after the firm has been transformed); see also supra note 108 (describing how the 
creation of an SE reduced the size of the Allianz supervisory board). 
300. See Herden & Kowalewsky, supra note 299, at 192 (quoting German corporate 
governance experts and politicians that a large number of firms will transform into SEs). 
  
2010] TILTING THE BALANCE? 855 
existing SEs are truly large firms, this assessment may be 
premature.301 Furthermore, the evidence compiled by 
Eidenmüller et al. suggests that SEs are more popular in 
countries with employee participation systems, such as Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Germany, or the Netherlands, than in others 
such as France, Italy Spain, or the United Kingdom, where SEs 
are rare relative to population size, or do not exist at all thus 
far.302 
Ultimately, whatever bargaining victory the SNB achieves, it 
may be a pyrrhic one since shareholders are unable to commit to 
retaining the results after a subsequent merger. It seems also 
unlikely that a court would consider a subsequent merger abusive 
in the case of a time lag of several years. The assessment that 
European corporate law legislation could result in an “erosion” 
of German codetermination303 may therefore well turn out right. 
CONCLUSION 
The possibilities of regulatory arbitrage put employees at a 
disadvantage compared to the traditional “protected” national 
systems of corporate law. Previous articles have pointed out that 
differences in ownership structure between Europe and the 
United States are likely to result in stronger risks in the European 
context due to the relatively unchecked power of controlling 
shareholders on the European continent. Due to differences in 
ownership structure, the results of regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities are likely to be very different from the United 
States, where regulatory competition seems to have largely 
reinforced the pre-eminence of managers over shareholder 
power. U.S. shareholders have traditionally been prevented by 
political forces (that have influenced securities law and financial 
regulation) from gaining an intrusive influence on firms.304 True, 
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no state in the United States has implemented an employee 
participation system. Still, employees have often figured 
prominently in the debate on hostile takeovers, in which 
managers asserted their independence and insulation. U.S. 
managers’ assertion of their independence has probably shielded 
employees from takeovers to some extent—where employee and 
managerial interests overlap, it has most likely done so even 
without employees having a formal influence on decisions 
whether or not to reincorporate. 
In continental Europe, by contrast, blockholders dominate 
corporate governance. Controlling shareholders are not only in a 
position to use their influence to the detriment of other 
stakeholders, but they are also the likely beneficiaries. Their 
position has been strengthened further by the regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities created by EU law that can undermine 
pro-employee institutions of national corporate governance 
systems. Employee participation systems are the main issue that 
could become a target of regulatory arbitrage. While EU law sets 
certain limits to arbitrage by requiring negotiations, there are 
techniques that can allow patient shareholders to erode 
codetermination. The negotiation mechanism implemented by 
the SE Employees Directive and the Directive on Cross-Border 
Mergers does not provide complete protection, and even allows 
controlling shareholders to escape employee participation 
systems. Possible incentives in long-term commitment and firm-
specific investment are mitigated or eliminated because 
controlling shareholders can renege on a prior commitment to a 
particular law. 
Free choice of the corporate law regime regarding 
employees implies that shareholders cannot permanently 
commit. The reason why such mechanisms may sometimes be 
beneficial for firm-specific investment is precisely because they 
are likely to foster long-term commitment and trust. Regulatory 
arbitrage rules out a permanent commitment to codetermination 
or similar systems. Decisions on reincorporations are taken 
exclusively by shareholders, who cannot stipulate against mergers 
or the creation of an SE. The limits of “codetermination 
arbitrage” under European law remain tentative. Thus, even if an 
efficient ex ante choice is possible, specific investment by 
employees may not occur or be adjusted in anticipation of 
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opportunism. While employee participation systems used to be 
shielded from markets in the past, they no longer have a fair 
chance to prove themselves in the market, as regulatory arbitrage 
possibilities undermine the possible reason for their very 
existence. Given the new corporate law arbitrage possibilities, 
employees are likely to learn that their position is less safe (at 
least on the margins) and adjust their specific investment 
downward. Some scholars employing a “varieties of capitalism” 
approach have already identified developments in European law 
that affect the economic and political balance within national 
corporate governance systems.305 The regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities relating to employee participation will add to the 
changes that are already underway. 
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